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FINTECH: NEW BATTLE LINES IN THE PATENT WARS? 
Megan M. La Belle† & Heidi Mandanis Schooner† 
Historically, financial institutions have relied on trade secrets and first-mover 
advantages, rather than patents, to protect their inventions. For the few financial 
patents that were issued, conventional wisdom was that they weren’t terribly 
interesting or important. In our 2014 study on financial patents, we showed that banks 
were breaking from past patterns and increasingly seeking patent protection. We 
explained that financial institutions were primarily building their patent portfolios as 
a defensive measure—i.e., to protect themselves from infringement suits. Indeed, the 
finance industry successfully lobbied Congress to include provisions in the America 
Invents Act of 2011 that made it easier to invalidate financial patents through 
administrative review. Yet, two significant developments call for a revisit of our 2014 
study: first, the rise of fintech and, second, the recent $300 million verdict in the first 
bank-on-bank patent infringement suits—United Services Automobile Association 
(USAA) v. Wells Fargo. This paper explores how the rise of fintech has changed the 
purpose of patenting among banks, and what a possible fintech patent war would 
mean for the future of both the financial and patent systems in this country. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When fintech1 dreams dance in our heads, Satoshi Nakamoto2 is 
choreographing a technological revolution that democratizes finance by 
 
 1 Fintech is, pretty obviously, a portmanteau of “financial” and “technology.” For a 
discussion of the definition of fintech, see infra Section IV.A. 
 2 Satoshi Nakamoto is the pseudonym for the creator of bitcoin and the first blockchain 
database. See Benjamin Pirus, Internet Pioneer Still Argues Bitcoin Creator Satoshi Nakamoto Is 
This Obscure Mathematician, FORBES (May 30, 2020, 10:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
benjaminpirus/2020/05/30/internet-pioneer-argues-bitcoin-creator-satoshi-nakamoto-is-this-
obscure-mathematician/#655035782eb5 [https://perma.cc/3S3J-Q4T5]. 
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eliminating legacy firms and unleashing cheap financial services to the 
masses. When fintech occupies our nightmares, artificial intelligence 
controlled by behemoth tech companies takes control, as our savings and 
investments vanish into cyberspace. The reality of fintech, very likely, lies 
somewhere in between these utopian and dystopian imaginations.3 And 
yet, that reality could have its own real drama if patent protection 
becomes an important feature of fintech. 
In 2011, Apple sued Samsung for copying its iPhone design and set 
off a “patent war” between the two technology companies that raged on 
in the courts and in the public square for years.4 Yet, the Apple versus 
Samsung patent war was not a new phenomenon; patent wars have a long 
history in the United States.5 Much older inventions such as the 
telephone, sewing machine, airplane, laser, and diaper have all been the 
subject of patent wars.6 Why patent wars erupt in certain industries is 
hard to pinpoint. Perhaps overly aggressive patent owners’ efforts to 
quash competition are to blame. Or maybe the questionable validity of a 
patent provides the incentive for accused infringers to fight back instead 
of taking licenses. Another possibility is that particularly valuable 
technologies are worth the cost of war. Truth be told, identifying a single 
 
 3 Professor Saule Omarova describes opposing visions of fintech as follows: “Fintech may 
present a unique opportunity to correct the increasingly problematic imbalance between private 
misallocation of credit and the public’s ability to modulate credit aggregates, or it may further 
intensify that imbalance.” Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal: Fintech as a Systemic 
Phenomenon, 36 YALE J. REG. 735, 742 (2019). 
 4 See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald, The Great Smartphone War, VANITY FAIR (May 3, 2014), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2014/06/apple-samsung-smartphone-patent-war 
[https://perma.cc/R8PR-YYBQ]; Jack Nicas, Apple and Samsung End Smartphone Patent Wars, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/technology/apple-samsung-
smartphone-patent.html [https://perma.cc/5Z33-9HVC]; Andrea Peterson, The Smartphone 
Patent War Between Apple and Samsung Is Headed to the Supreme Court, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 
2016, 5:51 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/03/21/the-
smartphone-patent-war-between-apple-and-samsung-is-headed-to-the-supreme-court 
[https://perma.cc/UB2U-RUFZ]. 
 5 Adam Mossoff, Patents as Commercial Assets in Political, Legal and Social Context, 51 
TULSA L. REV. 455, 465 (2016) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER BEAUCHAMP, INVENTED BY LAW: 
ALEXANDER GRAHAM BELL AND THE PATENT THAT CHANGED AMERICA (2015)). 
 6 See id.; see also Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 325, 336 
(2012); Karl Jorda, Commentary: The Thirty-Year Laser Patent War, 43 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 545 
(2003); Adam Mossoff, Patent Licensing and Secondary Markets in the Nineteenth Century, 22 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 959, 963–64 (2015). 
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cause of any one of these patent wars is impossible.7 What history does 
make clear, however, is that patent wars will persist. The question, then, 
is which industry is most likely headed for battle. 
Commentators make headlines with speculation about future battle 
lines in the patent wars. The automobile industry, for example, is 
highlighted because of an uptick in patenting among manufacturers of 
technologies for self-driving and connected cars.8 Companies like Ford, 
Toyota, and Hyundai are obtaining patents at far greater rates than in the 
past. In 2018, Ford Global Technologies, LLC—the intellectual property 
arm of Ford Motor Company—was granted 2,123 patents, ranking it 
fourteenth on the list of issued patents that year.9 But these traditional 
players are not alone, as tech firms like Uber and Waymo are also 
securing patents in this space.10 Still, industry insiders remain skeptical 
about the possibility of a patent war in the auto industry because, 
historically, disputes among carmakers have been resolved quietly 
outside the courtroom.11 
A looming patent war over the internet of things (IoT) has also 
generated a good deal of chatter.12 IoT technologies—which generally 
refer to interconnected physical devices that collect and exchange 
information over the internet—include devices like the Fitbit, Amazon 
Echo, and Nest Thermostat.13 IoT is expected to expand rapidly in the 
near future with the introduction of 5G to connected cars, appliances 
 
 7 See, e.g., Pramath Malik & Manikandan Balasubramanian, In Search of the Next Patent 
War, IAM (June 1, 2015), https://www.iam-media.com/litigation/search-next-patent-war 
[https://perma.cc/VE2N-X5MG]. 
 8  Matthew Bultman, The Next Big Patent War? It Likely Won’t Be in Detroit, LAW360 (Feb. 
7, 2019, 7:30 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1126973/the-next-big-patent-war-it-likely-
won-t-be-in-detroit [https://perma.cc/G8VP-R3XN]. 
 9 INTELLECTUAL PROP. OWNERS ASS’N, TOP 300 ORGANIZATIONS GRANTED U.S. PATENTS IN 
2018 (2019), https://ipo.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/2018-Top-300-Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4FGA-CXFT]. 
 10 Bultman, supra note 8. 
 11 Id. 
 12 See, e.g., Kenie Ho, Internet of Things: Another Industry Patent War?, 8 LANDSLIDE 34 
(2015); Steven Pepe, Kevin J. Post & Lance W. Shapiro, Internet of Things: Next Patent War Zone, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 10, 2018, 7:06 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-and-telecom-law/
internet-of-things-next-patent-war-zone?context=search&index=1 [https://perma.cc/U7Y9-
8QN2]. 
 13 See, e.g., Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing 
Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 89 (2014). 
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(like refrigerators), and airplanes, to name just a few.14 Some predict that 
IoT will be at the center of the next patent war because the sheer number 
of patents involved, together with the need for industry-wide 
compatibility standards will make licensing arrangements (particularly 
with respect to standard essential patents) difficult to negotiate.15 In short, 
because IoT requires the convergence of disparate systems into a unified 
technology, it provides fertile ground for the next patent war. 
Others predict that the next major patent war will surround the 
rapidly growing cannabis industry.16 Not only are patents being issued on 
various strains of marijuana plants, but companies are also looking to 
expand their patent portfolios on various technologies related to 
cannabis. Devices and methods for delivering marijuana products, 
chemical compounds derived from marijuana, and edible marijuana 
products are among the new technologies that are potentially subject to 
patent protection.17 Indeed, last year, a Canadian company was issued a 
U.S. patent that covers a supposedly groundbreaking method for 
processing cannabis oil.18 But since marijuana remains illegal in the 
United States under federal law,19 the cannabis industry may be reluctant 
to become entangled in a prolonged legal battle over patents. 
 
 14 See, e.g., Marshall Phelps, Is 5G Being Weaponized?, FORBES (Feb. 25, 2019, 1:22pm), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/marshallphelps/2019/02/25/is-5g-being-weaponized/
#73002abc3a61 [https://perma.cc/U5N7-JHF6]. 
 15 Id.; see also Ho, supra note 12; Pepe et al., supra note 12. Standard essential patents are 
“patents essential to the implementation of standards in technology products.” Jorge L. 
Contreras, Taking It to the Limit: Shifting U.S. Antitrust Policy Toward Standards Development, 
103 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 66, 67 (2018). 
 16 Brett Schuman & Cynthia Hardman, Is a Cannabis Patent War Looming?, SILICON VALLEY 
BUS. J. (Jan. 4, 2018, 10:26 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/2018/01/03/
cannabis-patent-wars.html [https://perma.cc/P4PJ-C4T9]. 
 17 Madison Margolin, Future Weed: Formulations, Patents and Where Cannabis Is Going 
Next, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 20, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-
features/future-weed-formulations-patents-and-where-cannabis-is-going-next-781439 
[https://perma.cc/M4VL-Y47L]. 
 18 Press Release PR Newswire, Nextleaf Solutions Issued Significant U.S. Patent for Cannabis 
Post-Extraction Processing, MKTS. INSIDER (Sept. 3, 2019, 4:19 PM), https://
markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/nextleaf-solutions-issued-significant-u-s-patent-for-
cannabis-post-extraction-processing-1028495314 [https://perma.cc/4X3T-LV87]. 
 19 Aaron Smith, The U.S. Legal Marijuana Industry is Booming, CNN MONEY (Jan. 31, 2018, 
4:03 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/01/31/news/marijuana-state-of-the-union/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/A9ZP-ZFZA]. 
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Most pertinent to this Article is the possibility of a patent war 
erupting over fintech. Fintech products like cryptocurrencies and robo-
financial advisors capture our imagination much like the Jetsons’ flying 
car did a generation ago. Moreover, the narrative of fintech startups 
challenging their stodgy bank competitors echoes the classic David versus 
Goliath struggle. While some fintech firms have successfully challenged 
banks (the success of Quicken Loans is an example), it remains unclear 
whether fintech firms will truly disrupt the banking industry.20 Consider 
blockchain platforms21—one of the most anticipated financial 
innovations in recent history. While many fintech startup firms are 
seeking to develop blockchain applications, banks are not likely to be left 
behind.22 
Conventional wisdom has been that financial institutions do not rely 
on patent rights to protect their innovations. Historically, many financial 
products were not patentable because they were deemed abstract ideas 
and thus not protectable under certain judicially-created exceptions to 35 
U.S.C. § 101—the statute governing patentable subject matter. What is 
more, because financial innovation was fast-paced and constantly 
evolving, the industry was better served by first-mover advantages and 
trade secrets as opposed to patents, which take more time, effort, and 
resources to secure.23 Thus, banks did not patent all that much,24 and the 
few financial patents they did issue were not considered terribly 
interesting or important. 
In our 2014 study of bank patents,25 we showed that banks were 
breaking from past patterns and increasingly seeking patent protection. 
We traced the changes in law that allowed for this shift and explored 
 
 20 See, e.g., René Lacerte, Banks vs. FinTech? No Contest. Banks Win, AM. BANKER (Jan. 8, 
2016, 12:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/banks-vs-fintech-no-contest-
banks-win [https://perma.cc/F4HV-GFHG]. 
 21 See infra Part IV for discussion of blockchain and other distributed ledger technologies. 
 22 See infra Part V (regarding banks’ patent activity). 
 23  Megan M. La Belle & Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Big Banks and Business Method Patents, 
16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 431, 470–80 (2014) (discussing the patent activity of large banks). 
 24 In 2009, Robert M. Hunt observed that only one in ten business method patents were 
obtained by financial institutions. Robert M. Hunt, Business Method Patents and U.S. Financial 
Services (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 08-10, 2009), 
https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/
2008/wp08-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/PAU6-GWN7]. 
 25 La Belle & Schooner, supra note 23. 
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banks’ incentives to patent their innovation. Several significant 
developments call for a revisit of our earlier study: first, the precipitous 
rise of fintech, which is seen, at least by its enthusiasts, as not just a 
continuation of a long history of financial innovation but rather a leap 
forward that will transform financial services; second, the continued 
interest in patenting by banks, including applications involving 
blockchain and other cutting-edge innovations; and, third, evolution of 
precedent of the Covered Business Method (CBM) program, which 
allows parties facing infringement claims on patents for financial 
products or services to initiate an administrative review of the patent’s 
validity. Our 2014 study examined the early experience with CBM 
proceeding, and here we revisit CBM as the 2020 sunset date draws near. 
Finally, the recent $300 million verdicts in the first-ever patent 
infringement cases brought by one bank against another—United Services 
Automobile Ass’n (USAA) v. Wells Fargo Bank26—may signal a significant 
shift in the way banks think about and utilize patents. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides 
background on the traditional features of financial innovation. Part II 
explores the relationship between financial innovation and the patent 
system, with a focus on the creation of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit, its impact on financial innovation, and the call for 
reform that culminated in the passage of the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act (AIA) of 2011. Part III then discusses CBM proceedings, the 
primary feature of the AIA directed at financial innovation. Parts IV and 
V turn to the rise of fintech, the increasing importance of patents to the 
finance industry, and the evolving role of patent litigation in financial 
innovation, specifically, the implications of USAA v. Wells Fargo—the 
first bank-on-bank patent infringement suits. Finally, Part VI considers 
the possibility of a fintech patent war. It explores the battle lines that 
could be drawn among the various interested parties, as well as alternative 
outcomes, which could have lasting implications on the financial industry 
and the patent system. 
 
 26 Complaint, United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 2:18-CV-00366 (E.D. Tex. 
Aug. 17, 2018); Verdict Form at 7, United Servs. Auto Ass’n v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 2:18-CV-
00366 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2018); Complaint, United Servs. Auto Ass’n v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 
2:18-CV-00245 (E.D. Tex. June 7, 2018); Verdict Form at 6, United Servs. Auto Ass’n v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, No. 2:18-CV-00245 (E.D. Tex. June 7, 2018). 
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I.      TRADITIONAL FEATURES OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 
Definitions of financial innovation include both the positive and the 
normative. The positive definition focuses on the creation of something 
new—a new product, market, technology, or institution.27 The normative 
focuses on the benefits derived from financial innovation—decrease in 
costs, increase in access, or improved products or services.28 Both the 
demand side (customers) and the supply side (financial institutions) 
stimulate financial innovation. Customers demand more and better 
products and services, e.g., faster loan approvals and greater product 
choice.29 Financial institutions seek lower costs and higher profits, e.g., 
technological improvements that reduce operating expenses. Naturally, 
while financial innovation can be beneficial it can also be costly if, for 
example, innovations stifle competition.30 
Financial innovation is often grouped into categories. Some scholars 
have sorted financial innovation into these buckets: new products or 
services, new processes/procedures, and new organizations.31 This 
grouping would distinguish adjustable rate mortgages (a new product) 
from risk modeling (a new procedure) from fintech national banks32 (a 
 
 27 Peter  Tufano’s definition focuses on newness and widespread adoption: “Broadly 
speaking, financial innovation is the act of creating and then popularizing new financial 
instruments as well as new financial technologies, institutions and markets.” Peter Tufano, 
Financial Innovation, in HANDBOOK OF THE ECON. OF FIN. 310 (George M. Constantinides, M. 
Harris & Rene M. Stulz eds., 2003). 
 28 W. Scott Frame and Lawrence White define financial innovation as “something new that 
reduces costs, reduces risks, or provides an improved product/service/instrument that better 
satisfies participants’ demands.” W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, Empirical Studies of 
Financial Innovation: Lots of Talk, Little Action?, 42 J. ECON. LITERATURE 116, 118 (2004). 
 29 For example, mobile-obsessed millennials are often credited or blamed for driving 
innovation. FIN. STABILITY BD., FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS FROM FINTECH: 
SUPERVISORY AND REGULATORY ISSUES THAT MERIT AUTHORITIES’ ATTENTION 35 (2017), 
http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/R270617.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QKY-TAV4] 
 30 For a discussion of the costs and benefits of financial innovation, see La Belle & Schooner, 
supra note 23, at 438–40. 
 31 See Frame & White, supra note 28, at 118. 
 32 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), a federal bank regulator, recently 
announced that it would begin accepting applications for national bank charters from fintech 
companies engaged in banking. See OCC Begins Accepting National Bank Charter Applications 
from Financial Technology Companies, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY (July 31, 
2018), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2018/nr-occ-2018-74.html 
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new organization). Others have delineated functional categories: 
payments, saving, investment, and risk-bearing.33 This distinguishes such 
things as general purpose credit cards (payments) from pension plans 
(savings) and student loans (investment) from insurance (risk-bearing). 
No matter the category, finance is in a constant state of change, and 
many financial innovations coincide with important moments in history. 
In 1863, Congress established new national (i.e., federally chartered) 
banks as a means to finance the Civil War.34 The laws relevant to the 
creation of national banks were expected to lead to the demise of state-
chartered banks.35 Yet, the creation of the checking account allowed state-
chartered banks to survive,36 and they persist to this day.37 In a much 
more recent historical moment, innovative financial products were 
blamed, at least in part, for the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009.38 The 
unregulated over-the-counter derivatives, in particular the credit default 
 
[https://perma.cc/9UV5-4FLU]. Significant controversy surrounds its decision. Both the 
Conference of State Bank Examiners and the New York Department of Financial Services have 
filed suits against the OCC claiming that issuing such charters exceeds the OCC’s authority. Alan 
S. Kaplinsky, State Regulators File Second Lawsuit Opposing OCC Fintech Charter, CONSUMER 
FIN. MONITOR (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2018/10/29/state-
regulators-file-second-lawsuit-opposing-occ-fintech-charter [https://perma.cc/6END-Q7JS]. 
 33 Robert E. Litan, In Defense of Much, But Not All, Financial Innovation, BROOKINGS INST. 
(Feb. 17, 2010), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0217_financial_
innovation_litan.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5ZV-SKS5]. 
 34 See generally Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Recent Challenges to the Persistent Dual Banking 
System, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 263, 265 (1996). 
 35 The expectation was that when national banks were established by Congress in 1863, state 
banks would convert their charters. Id. When that didn’t happen, Congress passed a tax on state-
issued bank notes. Id.; see also History: 1863–1865, Founding of the National Banking System, 
OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, https://www.occ.treas.gov/about/who-we-
are/history/1863-1865/index-occ-history-1863-1865.html [https://perma.cc/W7XT-7F5X]. 
 36 History: 1866-1913, The System in Operation, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE 
CURRENCY, https://www.occ.treas.gov/about/who-we-are/history/1866-1913/index-occ-history-
1866-1913.html [https://perma.cc/2QHL-5U7Q]. 
 37 In 2016, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation supervised 1,563 state-chartered 
banks, and the Federal Reserve supervised 829. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 
25 (2017), https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/report/2016annualreport/2016ar_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5GKU-RD4U]; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., FEDERAL RESERVE 
103RD ANNUAL REPORT 49 (2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2016-
annual-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PYH-9MSX]. 
 38 Litan, supra note 33. 
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swap which supported collateralized debt obligations,39 fueled the 
mortgage crisis which in turn brought down the rest of the economy.40 
Alongside discussions of the purported evils of the financial 
innovations that contributed to the Financial Crisis are lists of 
innovations viewed in a more positive light. Famously, in the wake of the 
Financial Crisis, Paul Volcker identified the automated teller machine 
(ATM) as the most important innovation in twenty years.41 Lists of 
“good” financial innovations also include credit and debit cards, money 
market funds, indexed mutual funds, credit scoring, adjustable rate 
mortgages, currency swaps, etc.42 
In short, financial innovation itself is nothing new. What has 
changed in the past two decades, however, is the nature of innovation in 
this sector43 and the way it is protected, exploited, and enforced. That shift 
is due not only to technological advances, but to major modifications to 
our patent system that came about, primarily, as a result of the creation 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.44 
 
 39 See GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. 
MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASED A CATASTROPHE 41–72 
(2009). The creation of the credit default swap is generally attributed to Blythe Masters, who was 
then an executive at J.P. Morgan. Id. at 41–57. 
 40 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT xxiii (2011), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [https://perma.cc/
XW5E-ZKR3]. 
 41 Paul Volcker, The Only Thing Useful Banks Have Invented in 20 Years Is the ATM, N.Y. 
POST (Dec. 13, 2009, 6:27 AM), http://nypost.com/2009/12/13/the-only-thing-useful-banks-
have-invented-in-20-years-is-the-atm [https://perma.cc/Z5QG-HAFZ]. The New York Times 
economist Paul Krugman expressed a similar sentiment; see Paul Krugman, Money for Nothing, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/opinion/27krugman.html 
[https://perma.cc/7FV3-ACDV]. 
 42 Litan, supra note 33; see also Simon Johnson & James Kwak, Finance: Before the Next 
Meltdown, DEMOCRACY J. (2006), http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/14/finance-before-
the-next-meltdown [https://perma.cc/7BYQ-WMHN]. 
 43 See infra Section IV.A for a discussion on the nature of fintech as a form of financial 
innovation. 
 44 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2015) (jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit). 
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II.      FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND THE PATENT SYSTEM 
Appropriability is a key consideration for innovators, including 
financial innovators. Traditionally, financial innovations were protected 
through trade secrets and first-mover advantages as opposed to through 
patent protection.45 That began to change in the 1980s after Congress 
established the Federal Circuit as a way to bring uniformity to and 
strengthen the nation’s patent system. Among other things, the Federal 
Circuit expanded the scope of patentable subject matter to include 
business methods.46 Over the next decade or so, the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (PTO) issued thousands of finance-related patents 
whose owners then sued—or threatened to sue—big banks like Bank of 
America, Citibank, and J.P. Morgan for infringement.47 The banks 
initially sought relief from the courts arguing that business methods 
should not be subject to patent protection.48 When that effort failed,49 
banks got the help they needed from Congress. 
A.      The Federal Circuit 
Since the dawn of the U.S. patent system in 1790, the country has 
experienced periods of stronger and weaker patent protection.50 Patents 
helped spur innovation in the late nineteenth century leading to 
revolutionary inventions such as the light bulb, airplane, and telephone.51 
The attitude toward patenting shifted in the time leading up to the Great 
Depression as big companies unfairly exploited their patent portfolios in 
 
 45 For a full discussion of the means for protecting financial innovations, see La Belle & 
Schooner, supra note 23, at 440–42. 
 46 State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 47 La Belle & Schooner, supra note 23, at 450–55. 
 48 State St., 149 F.3d at 1375. 
 49 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611–13 (2010) (business method patents are not 
categorically excluded under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006), which defines what inventions are 
patentable). 
 50 See, e.g., PETER S. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY & ROBERT P. MERGES, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 2017: VOL. I PERSPECTIVES, TRADE SECRETS AND 
PATENTS 160 (2017) (“The history of the U.S. patent system in the twentieth century reflects 
swings between greater and lesser protection.”). 
 51 Id. at 159. 
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anti-competitive ways.52 During World War II, however, new 
technologies were invented, ushering in a new era of patent protection 
that culminated in the passage of major patent reform: the Patent Act of 
1952.53 The 1952 Act made patents easier to obtain, and consequently the 
PTO issued record numbers of patents in the following decade. As the 
quantity of granted patents increased, the quality decreased, and so the 
1960s reached a low-water mark for patent protection, as federal courts 
invalidated litigated patents more often than not.54 Although the overall 
invalidation rate was high, the chances of success on a validity challenge 
depended in part on where the suit was filed because patent doctrine 
varied from circuit to circuit, and some circuits were particularly hostile 
to patents.55 
In the early 1980s, policymakers became convinced that this lack of 
uniformity in patent doctrine, coupled with courts’ willingness to cancel 
patents, was hindering innovation. Congress responded by passing the 
Federal Courts Improvement Act, pursuant to which the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created.56 The goal for the Federal 
Circuit, which was to have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent 
cases, was to promote certainty by making patent doctrine more 
uniform.57 Perhaps by design, the Federal Circuit also heralded a new era 
of protectionism for patent rights that lasted until Congress enacted the 
AIA in 2011. 
From the start, the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence worked to 
strengthen patent protection in myriad ways—for example, by making 
 
 52 See, e.g., Steven P. Reynolds, Antitrust and Patent Licensing: Cycles of Enforcement and 
Current Policy, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 129, 133–34 (1997) (“The 1920s saw the development of large, 
often international, patent pooling arrangements. Companies entered cross-licensing 
arrangements with their competitors, limiting entry to those that participated in the 
arrangement.”). 
 53 MENELL ET AL., supra note 50, at 160. 
 54 Id. 
 55 COMM’N ON REVISION OF FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., STRUCTURE & INTERNAL PROCS.: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 152 (1975) (explaining that patent owners “scramble[d] to get 
into the 5th, 6th and 7th circuits since the courts there [were] not inhospitable to patents whereas 
infringers scramble[d] to get anywhere but in th[o]se circuits”). 
 56 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 57 H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20–22 (1981). 
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injunctions virtually automatic,58 heightening the standard for 
invalidating patents on obviousness grounds,59 reviewing claim 
construction de novo,60 and making it extremely difficult for accused 
infringers to challenge patents via declaratory judgment actions.61 Most 
pertinent to this Article, the Federal Circuit expanded the scope of 
patentable subject matter under § 101 in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Signature Financial Group, Inc.62 In that case, the court held that business 
methods were patentable, despite long-standing practice of excluding 
such inventions from § 101.63 Section 101 provides that “[w]hoever 
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, 
or composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”64 
Business methods, the Federal Circuit reasoned, are “processes” within 
the meaning of this provision.65 Nor did any of the judicially-created 
exceptions to § 101—i.e., that laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas are excluded from patent protection—apply in this case.66 
Once the Supreme Court denied certiorari and the Federal Circuit 
reaffirmed its State Street holding in AT&T Corp. v. Excel 
Communications, Inc.,67 it became clear that the patent landscape was 
about to change.68 
The years following State Street saw a substantial rise in the number 
of business method patents granted by the PTO. Where the Patent Office 
 
 58 Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 59 ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984), abrogated 
by KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 60 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454–55 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc), 
abrogated by Teva Pharms., Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318 (2015). 
 61 Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004), abrogated by MedImmune, 
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
 62 State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), 
abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 63 Id. 
 64 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
 65 State St., 149 F.3d at 1373–77. 
 66 Id. 
 67 AT&T Crop. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999), abrogated by In re 
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 68 See, e.g., John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 
1140–41 (1999) (explaining that State Street was the latest in a series of cases testing the 
boundaries of the “useful [a]rts”). 
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issued 489 of these patents in 1998, that number grew to almost 2,000 a 
decade later.69 As more business method patents were issued, litigation 
surrounding those patents increased, too. Indeed, for a variety of reasons, 
business method patents ended up in litigation more frequently than 
other types of patents.70 Thus, major high-tech companies like Microsoft, 
Google, and Facebook, as well as financial institutions including Bank of 
America, Wells Fargo, and Citibank, were targets of infringement suits.71 
When attempts to reverse State Street were thwarted by the Federal 
Circuit and Supreme Court,72 attention turned to Congress. 
B.      Patent Reform 
The increasing litigation surrounding business method patents, 
together with other factors, ultimately led to a call for patent reform in 
the mid-2000s.73 Although high-tech companies spearheaded the charge, 
financial institutions joined the effort to revamp the way patents were 
issued and enforced.74 The banks turned, in particular, to Senators Chuck 
Schumer and Jeff Sessions for help.75 Early versions of the patent reform 
bill included provisions that would prevent patent owners from collecting 
damages from banks.76 When that proved unworkable, Congress took a 
different approach to protect financial institutions from the risks 
associated with patent infringement. 
 
 69 La Belle & Schooner, supra note 23, at 449. 
 70 See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 213–14 (2009) (detailing how “software 
patents are particularly prone to litigation and to disputes over patent boundaries”); La Belle & 
Schooner, supra note 23, at 451 (discussing why business method patents are more likely to be 
challenged). 
 71 La Belle & Schooner, supra note 23, at 452–55. 
 72 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 606 (2010) (“Section 101 similarly precludes the broad 
contention that the term ‘process’ categorically excludes business methods.”). 
 73 La Belle & Schooner, supra note 23, at 459. 
 74 Lisa Lerer, Finance Industry Leads on Patent Reform, POLITICO (July 31, 2007, 7:29 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2007/07/finance-industry-leads-on-patent-reform-005187 
[https://perma.cc/6RZZ-QXG8]. 
 75 La Belle & Schooner, supra note 23, at 455. 
 76 Id. 
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In 2011, Congress enacted the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 
(AIA)—the most comprehensive patent reform legislation since the 
1950s.77 Among other things, the AIA created a new administrative 
review body, known as the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), to 
oversee three new types of ex post proceedings: inter partes review (IPR), 
post-grant review (PGR), and covered business method review (CBM).78 
These proceedings all permit the PTO, via the PTAB, to take a second 
look at granted patents. But each comes with various limitations. 
With respect to IPR proceedings, any type of patent can be 
challenged, but the grounds are limited to novelty and non-obviousness.79 
PGR, by contrast, allows challenges on any ground “relating to invalidity 
of the patent,” but is only available for recent patents, meaning those 
issued pursuant to the AIA’s first-to-file system.80 Moreover, a PGR 
petition must be filed within nine months of the issuance of the patent, 
so the window for PGR challenges is short.81 Finally, CBM challenges are 
limited to a certain category of patents—namely, those related to financial 
services or products—and the CBM program is slated to expire after eight 
years.82 Nevertheless, CBMs are broad in that they can be used to target 
old or new patents (unlike PGRs), and can be based on any validity 
ground, including §§ 101 and 112 (unlike IPRs).83 
Since the AIA became effective in September 2012, the number of 
these PTAB petitions filed has greatly exceeded expectations. Of the 
three, IPR is by far the most popular, with 9,031 between September 16, 
2012 and January 31, 2019.84 On the other end of the spectrum, only 156 
 
 77 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 78 Id. sec. 6(a), § 311, 125 Stat. at 299 (adopting inter partes review); id. sec. 6(d), § 321, 125 
Stat. at 306 (adopting post-grant review); id. sec. 18(a), § 321 note, 125 Stat. at 329 (adopting 
covered business method review). 
 79 Id. sec. 6(a), § 311(b), 125 Stat. at 299. 
 80 Id. sec. 6(d), § 321(b), 125 Stat. at 306. 
 81 Id. sec. 6(d), § 321(c), 125 Stat. at 306. 
 82 Id. sec. 18(c), § 321 note, 125 Stat. at 331 (defining “covered business method patents” as 
a method used in the provision of a financial product or service); id. sec. 18(a)(3), § 321 note, 125 
Stat. at 330 (articulating the eight-year sunset provision). 
 83 Id. sec. 18(a), § 321 note, 125 Stat. at 330. 
 84 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., TRIAL STATISTICS IPR, PGR, CBM: PATENT TRIAL AND 
APPEAL BOARD 3 (2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/trial_statistics_
jan2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/UW6P-WQQ8]. 
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PGR petitions have been filed since the AIA was enacted.85 Although this 
number will likely increase as more first-to-file patents are issued, the 
nine-month window limits challengers’ ability to rely on PGR.86 That 
leaves CBM petitions in the middle with 589 filed as of February 24, 
2020.87 Though this number is small relative to IPRs, CBMs have played 
a key role in patent disputes over the past six years. 
III.      CBM REVIEW 
During the patent reform effort, stakeholders expended significant 
time and energy discussing and debating IPR and PGR. CBM, by contrast, 
was a late addition to the reform package.88 CBM nonetheless became 
important for two reasons. First, patents could be challenged on § 101 
grounds in CBM, unlike IPR. Beginning in 2012, the Supreme Court 
decided a trilogy of cases—Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 
Laboratories, Inc.,89 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 
Inc.,90 and Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International91—that 
reinvigorated the judicially-created exceptions to § 101 and made it easier 
than ever to invalidate patents on subject matter grounds in CBM 
 
 85 Id. 
 86 Dennis Crouch, No Real Consensus Yet on CBM Sunsetting, PATENTLY-O (May 15, 2017), 
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/05/real-consensus-sunsetting.html [https://perma.cc/
W4NN-GQ77]. 
 87 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., TRIAL STATISTICS IPR, PGR, CBM: PATENT TRIAL AND 
APPEAL BOARD 3 (2020), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Trial_Statistics_
2020_02_29.pdf [https://perma.cc/EU3J-C7A2]. These statistics reflect the number of petitions 
filed rather than the number of distinct patents challenged in CBM proceedings. While concerns 
have been expressed about serial petitions on the same patent, a recent study shows that most 
patents challenged in CBM proceedings were challenged only once. See U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-320, ASSESSMENT OF THE COVERED BUS. METHOD PAT. REV. 
PROGRAM 19–20 (2018) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690595.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MQ5K-UUX4] (“[A]mong the 359 patents challenged under the CBM 
program [between Sept. 2012 and Sept. 2017], 73.3 percent were challenged once . . . .”). 
 88 See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform Act of 2011: An Overview, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 10, 
2011), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2011/02/patent-reform-act-of-2011-an-overview.html 
[https://perma.cc/NU33-88GG] (showing that, just over six months before the AIA was passed, 
CBM wasn’t even part of the legislation). 
 89 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
 90 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc, 569 U.S. 576 (2013). 
 91 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). 
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proceedings and in court.92 Second, as discussed in detail below, the PTO, 
PTAB, and Federal Circuit took, at least initially, an expansive view of 
section 18 in terms of the types of patents that would be subject to CBM 
review. 
A.      Section 18 and CBM Review 
Congress provided for CBM review in section 18 of the AIA.93 
Section 18 permits parties accused of infringement to challenge patents 
on any validity ground as long as they are considered “covered business 
method” patents.94 Section 18 goes on to define “covered business method 
patent” as “a patent that claims a method or corresponding apparatus for 
performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, 
administration, or management of a financial product or service, except 
that the term does not include patents for technological inventions.”95 
Section 18 further requires the PTO to promulgate regulations for 
determining whether a patent falls within that final provision, referred to 
as the “technological invention exception.”96 
Early on, CBM proceedings received relatively little attention. While 
a few critics claimed that section 18 was a “bailout” for the banks,97 CBM 
by far was the least controversial of the three administrative proceedings 
created by the AIA, with practically no discussion of section 18 in the 
Senate.98 Perhaps this was because Congress believed the term “covered 
 
 92 Megan M. La Belle, Essay, Introduction: The Past, Present, and Future of the U.S. Patent 
System, 67 CATH. U. L. REV. 605, 612–13 (2018). For a full discussion of the impact that this 
trilogy of cases has had on § 101 jurisprudence, see generally Paul R. Gugliuzza, Quick Decisions 
in Patent Cases, 106 GEO. L.J. 619 (2018). 
 93 Because section 18 is temporary and will sunset after eight years, it was not codified in the 
U.S. Code. However, the provisions of the AIA relevant to CBM are set out in the notes to 35 
U.S.C. § 321. 
 94 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 18(a), § 321 note, 125 Stat. 284, 
329 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 95 Id. sec. 18(d)(1), § 321 note, 125 Stat. at 331. 
 96 Id. sec. 18(d)(2), § 321 note, 125 Stat. at 331. 
 97 See, e.g., Paul Michel, Rein in the Big Bank Bail Out, PATENTLY-O (July 7, 2011), 
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2011/07/guest-post-rein-in-the-big-bank-bail-out.html [https://
perma.cc/KX2Y-AUDC]. 
 98 See La Belle & Schooner, supra note 23, at 463–64. There was some debate in the House 
over CBM, with Representative Shock offering an amendment that would strike section 18 from 
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business method patent” had been defined narrowly.99 Or maybe 
lawmakers were not overly concerned because of the sunset provision 
ending the CBM program after eight years.100 Whatever the initial beliefs 
about CBM, the PTO soon made clear—first through regulations, and 
then through PTAB decisions—that it would interpret CBM provisions 
broadly.101 
B.      The PTO’s Interpretation of Section 18 
Shortly after the AIA was enacted, the PTO embarked on a course of 
rulemaking per Congress’s mandate. In August 2012, the agency 
promulgated regulations to govern PTAB proceedings, including 
CBM.102 For starters, the term “covered business method patent” was 
defined as “a patent that claims a method or corresponding apparatus for 
performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, 
administration, or management of a financial product or service, except 
that the term does not include patents for technological inventions.”103 
On its face, this definition is unhelpful because it simply mirrors the 
statutory language in section 18 of the AIA. The PTO’s commentary, 
however, provides additional guidance.104 For example, the agency 
rejected a suggestion that “financial product or service” is limited to the 
financial services industry.105 Similarly, the agency refused to limit CBM 
 
the bill because he believed it was a bailout for the banks. Id. In the end, however, Shock’s 
amendment was voted down 262–158. Id. 
 99 See infra Section III.B (regarding CBM proceedings being limited to patents of “financial 
products or services”). 
 100 AIA, sec. 18(a)(3), § 321 note, 125 Stat. at 330. 
 101 See, e.g., P. Andrew Riley, Jonathan R.K. Stroud & Jeffrey Totten, The Surprising Breadth 
of Post-Grant Review for Covered-Business-Method Patents: A New Way to Challenge Patent 
Claims, 15 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 235 (2014); Anthony C. Tridico & Rachel L. Emsley, 
Covered Business Method Review—Is it Applicable to More Patents Than You Thought?, CIPA J. 
(2015), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/articles/covered-business-method-review-is-it-
applicable-to-more-patents.html [https://perma.cc/JD2A-63ZX]. 
 102 Transitional Program for CBM Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,734 (Aug. 14, 2012) (codified at 37 
C.F.R pt. 42). 
 103 37 C.F.R. § 42.301 (2012). 
 104 Transitional Program for CBM Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,735–36. 
 105 Id. at 48,736 (response to comment 3). 
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review to 705 patents.106 Instead, the agency opined, a broad 
interpretation of “financial product or services” is supported by the 
legislative history of section 18—namely, statements by Senator Schumer 
that CBM patents encompass patents “claiming activities that are 
financial in nature, incidental to a financial activity or complementary to 
a financial activity.”107 Paradoxically, the PTO cites this legislative history 
as supporting a broad interpretation of “financial product or service” 
when the language employed by Senator Schumer derives from federal 
banking law statutes which limit permissible activities of banks.108 
Finally, the PTO’s regulations address section 18’s “technological 
invention exception” to help determine which patents will not be subject 
to CBM review. Historically speaking, technology was a requirement for 
patentability, which is why business methods were excluded from patent 
protection before State Street.109 Even after State Street, courts have 
continued to use technology as a dividing line for those inventions that 
should be patentable and those that should not.110 Yet the concept of 
“technology” has always been elusive, so the task of defining the exception 
 
 106 Id. (response to comment 5). 
 107 Id. at 48,735 (response to comment 1). 
 108 Senator Schumer explained that CBM patents included those that are “financial in nature, 
incidental to financial activity or complementary to a financial activity.” 157 CONG. REC. S5432 
(daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Schumer). This financial in nature clause is derived 
from an important federal banking statute from 1999. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k). That clause was added 
to the Bank Holding Company Act, May 9, 1956, c. 240, § 2, 70 Stat. 133 pursuant to the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley-Act of 1999 (GLB), Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.). The financial–in–nature clause limits the 
activities of commercial banks (colloquially, FDIC-insured banks) and their holding companies 
to financial activities in order to prevent banks and their holding companies from engaging in 
non-financial commercial activities. This separation of banking from commerce has been a 
defining feature of the United States’s banking system since the Great Depression. See generally 
Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and Commodities, 98 
MINN. L. REV. 265, 273–77 (2013). Thus, because under federal banking law, the financial in 
nature clause limits a banks’ activities, it is paradoxical that the PTO cites the financial–in–nature 
clause in support of a broad interpretation of CBM. 
 109 Jeff Kettle, Congress Giveth and Taketh Away: A Look at Section 18 of the America Invents 
Act and the Review of Business Method Patents, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 201, 210–
11 (2012). 
 110 See Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (stating 
technological improvements are patentable because they “drive innovation”); Research Corp. 
Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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was not an easy one for the PTO.111 Having considered a plethora of 
comments from stakeholders, the agency ultimately decided that the 
question of whether the technological invention exception applies will be 
made on a case-by-case basis.112 More pointedly, the decision will depend 
on “whether the claimed subject matter as a whole recites a technological 
feature that is novel and unobvious over the prior art; and solves a 
technical problem using a technical solution.”113 
C.      The PTAB’s Treatment of CBM Patents 
Once promulgated, the next question was how the PTO’s regulations 
would be applied and interpreted by the PTAB. It didn’t take long to find 
out. On September 16, 2012—the very first day CBM became available—
SAP America, Inc. (SAP) petitioned the PTAB to institute a CBM review 
of U.S. Patent No. 6,553,350 (“‘350 patent”), owned by Versata 
Development Group, Inc.114 Among other things, SAP argued that the 
‘350 patent, entitled “method and apparatus for pricing products in 
multi-level product and organizational groups,” was invalid under § 101 
of the Patent Act.115 
Versata initially responded to SAP’s petition by arguing that the ‘350 
patent was not directed to a “covered business method patent” and thus 
not subject to CBM review.116 Even the broadest reasonable definition of 
“financial services and products,” Versata claimed, would not include the 
‘350 patent.117 Versata cited, inter alia, federal statutes and regulations 
 
 111 Kelvin W. Willoughby, How Much Does Technology Really Matter in Patent Law? A 
Comparative Analysis of Doctrines of Appropriate Patentable Subject Matter in American and 
European Patent Law, 18 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 63, 67 (2008) (“The typical view seems to be, ‘we 
cannot define technology, but we all know it when we see it.’”). 
 112 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(b) (2012). 
 113 Id. 
 114 Petition for Post-Grant Review Under 35 U.S.C. § 321 and § 18 of the Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act, SAP Am., Inc. v. Versata Software, Inc., No. CBM2012-00001, 2012 WL 
10475693 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 16, 2012). 
 115 Id. SAP also challenged the ‘350 patent under §§ 102 and 112, but the PTAB’s decision 
ultimately rested on § 101. See infra notes 123–25. 
 116 Patent Owner Versata Dev. Grp, Inc.’s Preliminary Response, SAP Am., Inc. v. Versata 
Software, Inc., No. CBM2012-00001, 2012 WL 10057302 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 30, 2012). 
 117 Id. at *31–37. 
LABELLE.SCHOONER.42.1.2 (Do Not Delete) 1/13/21  10:37 AM 
2020] FINTECH: NEW BATTLE LINES 297 
 
which define “financial product” in support of their narrower 
interpretation.118 Each of these definitions focuses on banking, securities, 
and insurance products. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act defines “financial product” as “a security, an 
insurance product (including an insurance product that pays a return, 
whether fixed or variable), a bank product, and a loan product.”119 Federal 
Trade Commission regulations define “financial product or service” as 
“any product or service that a financial holding company could offer by 
engaging in a financial activity under section 4(k) of the Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1956.”120 As discussed above, the Bank Holding 
Company Act defines activities that are financial in nature as including 
lending, insuring, and securities activities.121 
In the end, the PTAB rejected Versata’s arguments and concluded 
that the ‘350 patent is a “covered business method patent” under 
section 18 because it “claims methods and corresponding apparatus for 
determining a price, and relates to management of pricing data and is 
classified in class 705.”122 In reaching this conclusion, the PTAB relied 
heavily on the PTO’s statements that the legislative history of section 18 
(specifically, Senator Schumer’s statements) supports a broad definition 
of “covered business method patent.”123 Although Senator Schumer’s 
phraseology—“financial in nature, incidental to a financial activity or 
complementary to a financial activity”—mirrors language from the Bank 
Holding Company Act, the PTAB refused to limit the definition as 
Versata urged because such a narrow construction would contradict the 
legislative history of section 18.124 Consequently, the PTAB instituted a 
 
 118 Id. 
 119 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376, 1942 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5537(a)(2)). 
 120 16 C.F.R. § 313.3(l)(1) (2012). 
 121 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4) (2010); see supra note 108 and accompanying text (identifying the 
Bank Holding Company Act definition as language meant to limit the activities of banking 
holding companies). 
 122 SAP Am., Inc. v. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. No. CBM2012-00001, 2013 WL 5947661, at *9 
(P.T.A.B. Jan. 9, 2013). 
 123 Id. at *9–10. 
 124 Id. 
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CBM review of the ‘350 patent, and subsequently issued a final decision 
cancelling several claims as unpatentable under § 101.125 
Thus, the message from the PTO about the scope of CBM review was 
clear: it should be broad because, in the agency’s opinion, that is what 
Congress intended. Of course, the PTO does not have the final word on 
all AIA-related matters; instead, Congress granted the Federal Circuit 
power to review PTAB decisions in certain circumstances.126 Versata, 
therefore, raised the question of whether the Federal Circuit would review 
the PTAB’s decision on what constitutes a “covered business method 
patent” and, if so, whether the court would concur with the PTAB’s broad 
construction. 
D.      The Federal Circuit and CBM Review 
1.      The Federal Circuit’s Early Interpretation of Section 18 
Having lost at the PTAB, Versata appealed to the Federal Circuit 
arguing, first, that the administrative tribunal wrongly concluded that the 
‘350 patent was subject to CBM review, and, second, that the PTAB erred 
on the merits when it invalidated the patent under § 101.127 SAP—
together with the PTO, which had entered the case as an intervenor128—
countered that the Federal Circuit lacked the power to consider Versata’s 
first argument because the AIA precludes judicial review of these types of 
institutional decisions by the PTAB.129 Specifically, appellees relied on 35 
U.S.C. § 324(e), which provides that “[t]he determination by the Director 
 
 125 Id. at *13–17, *20. 
 126 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 6(a), § 319, 125 Stat. 284, 
304 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). (“A party dissatisfied with 
the final written decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board . . . may appeal the decision . . . .”); 
id. sec. 6(d), § 329, 125 Stat. at 311 (“A party dissatisfied with the final written decision of the 
Patent Trial and Appeal Board . . . may appeal the decision . . . .”). 
 127 Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1313–14 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 128 35 U.S.C. § 143 (2011) (“The Director shall have the right to intervene in an appeal from a 
decision entered by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board in a . . . post-grant review under chapter 
31 or 32.”). 
 129 Versata, 793 F.3d at 1314–15. 
LABELLE.SCHOONER.42.1.2 (Do Not Delete) 1/13/21  10:37 AM 
2020] FINTECH: NEW BATTLE LINES 299 
 
whether to institute a post-grant review under this section shall be final 
and nonappealable.”130 
Generally speaking, agency decisions are subject to judicial review. 
Section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides that “[a] 
person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely 
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant 
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”131 What is more, the 
Supreme Court has interpreted this provision liberally, explaining that 
section 702 “embodies the basic presumption of judicial review” and 
“must be given a hospitable interpretation.”132 Recently, the Court has 
taken this a step further, holding that there’s a “strong presumption” in 
favor of judicial review of administrative decisions, even when 
interpreting statutes that purport to preclude review.133 
Yet, it is well-settled that Congress can and does preclude judicial 
review of certain agency actions. Not only is this contemplated by the text 
of the APA,134 but the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged 
Congress’s power to preclude judicial review, both explicitly and 
implicitly.135 Courts have been circumspect, however, when it comes to 
preclusion of constitutional claims, requiring that there must be clear 
evidence of Congress’s intent.136 Indeed, in every case where the Supreme 
Court has confronted this question, it has found no clear evidence of 
 
 130 Section 324(e) and all other provisions related to PGR apply to CBM proceedings unless 
Congress stated otherwise in section 18. See AIA, sec. 18(c), § 321 note, 125 Stat. at 329 (“The 
transitional proceeding implemented pursuant to this subsection shall be regarded as, and shall 
employ the standards and procedures of, a post-grant review under chapter 32 of title 35, United 
States Code, subject to the following.”). 
 131 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237, § 10(a) (1946) (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 702). 
 132 Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140–41 (1967) (internal quotations omitted). 
 133 Mach Mining, LLC v. E.E.O.C., 575 U.S. 480, 486 (2015). 
 134 APA, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2018) (“This chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof, 
except to the extent that—(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed 
to agency discretion by law.”). 
 135 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140–41 (2016); see also Johnson v. 
Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 367 (1974) (discussing how Congress prohibited review of decisions of 
law or fact that “arise in the administration by the Veterans’ Administration of a statute providing 
benefits for veterans[]” (emphasis omitted)); Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984) 
(finding implicit preclusion based on statutory scheme as a whole). 
 136 Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988). 
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congressional intent and allowed the constitutional claims to be 
reviewed.137 
Turning back to Versata, section 324(e) plainly precludes review of 
“determination[s] by the Director whether to institute a post-grant 
review . . . .”138 But what’s not clear is what Congress meant by a 
“determination . . . whether to institute a post-grant review.”139 For IPR, 
PGR, and CBM, the AIA provides that (1) the challenger files a petition 
to institute,140 and (2) the PTO Director may institute the proceeding only 
if there is a “reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with 
respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”141 With 
respect to CBM, moreover, the Act provides that “[t]he Director may 
institute a transitional proceeding only for a patent that is a covered 
business method patent.”142 So the question is whether Congress intended 
to preclude judicial review of all questions related to institution—
including, for CBM, if a patent is a “covered business method patent”—
or only of the PTO’s decision about the petitioner’s likelihood of 
prevailing.143 
 
 137 Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“[I]t has become something of a 
time-honored tradition for the Supreme Court and lower federal courts to find that Congress did 
not intend to preclude altogether judicial review of constitutional claims in light of the serious 
due process concerns that such preclusion would raise.”). 
 138 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 6(d), § 324(c), 125 Stat. 284, 
307 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 324(e)) (2011)). 
 139 Id. 
 140 See id. sec. 6(a), § 311(a), 125 Stat. at 299 (“[A] person who is not the owner of a patent 
may file with the Office a petition to institute an inter partes review of the patent.”); id. sec. 6(d), 
§ 321(a), 125 Stat. at 306 (“[A] person who is not the owner of a patent may file with the Office 
a petition to institute a post-grant review of the patent.”); id. sec. 18(a)(1)(B), § 321 note, 125 
Stat. at 330 (“A person may not file a petition for a transitional proceeding with respect to a 
covered business method patent unless the person or the person’s real party in interest or privy 
has been sued for infringement of the patent or has been charged with infringement under that 
patent.”). 
 141 See id. sec. 6(a), § 314(a), 125 Stat. at 300 (establishing threshold for institution of IPR 
review); id. sec. 6(d), § 324(a), 125 Stat. at 306 (establishing threshold for institution of PGR and 
CBM review). 
 142 Id. sec. 18(a)(1)(E), 125 Stat. at 330. 
 143 The Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have addressed other questions about judicial 
review of institution-related decisions in IPR cases. See, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 
136 S. Ct. 2131, 2131 (2016) (holding that PTAB’s decision to institute IPR because petitioner 
had a reasonable likelihood of prevailing was not subject to judicial review even after final written 
decision); Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc) (holding 
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The Versata panel ultimately divided over this question. A majority 
of the court concluded that, because the PTAB’s decision that the ‘350 
patent was a “covered business method patent” did not constitute a 
“determination . . . whether to institute a post-grant review” under 
§ 324(e), it was subject to judicial review.144 In so doing, the majority 
distinguished the decision to institute from the final decision to invalidate 
a patent, which is reviewable.145 The court explained that these “distinct 
agency actions do not become the same just because the agency decides 
certain issues”—e.g., whether a patent is a “covered business method 
patent”—at the institution stage rather than the final decision stage of the 
proceeding.146 Instead, the majority reasoned, the determination that a 
patent is a CBM patent “subject[s] it to a special PTAB power to 
invalidate,” rendering it part of the invalidation decision, rather than the 
institution decision, and therefore subject to judicial review.147 
Once the Federal Circuit decided it had the power to review the 
PTAB’s decision that the ‘350 patent was a CBM patent, the court had to 
define the scope of the term “covered business method patent.”148 The 
court agreed with the PTO that the term should be interpreted broadly to 
“encompass patents claiming activities that are financial in nature, 
incidental to a financial activity or complementary to a financial 
activity.”149 In so doing, the court recognized that Congress delegated 
rulemaking authority to the PTO “in the establishment and 
implementation of this transitional post-grant review proceeding,” and 
 
that AIA does not preclude judicial review of PTAB’s decision to institute IPR proceedings 
despite one-year time-bar), rev’d Achates Reference Publ’g, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 803 F.3d 652, 658 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that AIA precluded judicial review of PTAB decision on time-bar). 
Although a full discussion of these cases is beyond the scope of this Article, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Cuozzo is explained further infra. 
 144 Versata Dev. Grp. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1314–23 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 145 Id. at 1319. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. at 1320–21. Judge Hughes, on the other hand, wrote a lengthy dissent because he 
believed that that the plain language, structure, and purpose of section 324(e) unambiguously 
precluded judicial review of the PTAB’s decision about what qualifies as a “covered business 
method patent.” Id. at 1337. 
 148 Id. at 1323–26. 
 149 Id. at 1324–25. 
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thus afforded the agency “substantial deference”—albeit without 
specifying the type of deference at play.150 
By interpreting “covered business method patent” broadly, the 
Federal Circuit enabled the use of section 18 proceedings to challenge a 
wide range of patents.151 To be sure, 589 CBM petitions were filed 
between September 16, 2012 and February 24, 2020,152 often on § 101 
grounds.153 Although financial companies were among those petitioners, 
technology firms like Apple and Google were the heavy users of CBM 
review154 until the Federal Circuit changed course regarding its 
interpretation of “covered business method patent” in Unwired Planet, 
LLC v. Google Inc.155 and Secure Axcess, LLC v. PNC Bank National 
Ass’n.156 
 
 150 Id. at 1325–26. The Federal Circuit appears to have been applying either Chevron or 
Skidmore deference here. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (holding that 
when Congress gives the agency the authority to make decisions carrying the force of law, and 
the agency acts on that authority, Chevron deference applies; otherwise Skidmore deference 
applies). While this undoubtedly is an important distinction, it does not matter for purposes of 
this paper. All that matters is that the Federal Circuit afforded the agency some sort of 
deference—something that subsequent panels of the Federal Circuit fail to do, as discussed infra. 
 151 The Federal Circuit interpreted “covered business method patent” broadly in several cases 
other than Versata. See, e.g., Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) (affirming the Board’s decision that CBM review is not limited to patent claims tied to the 
financial sector); SightSound Techs., LLC v. Apple Inc., 809 F.3d 1307, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(relying on Versata to hold that CBM patents are “not limited to products and services of only 
the financial industry, or to patents owned by or directly affecting activities of financial 
institutions” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 152 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 153 See, e.g., Manny Schecter, Shawn Ambwani, Alexander Shei & Robert Jain, The Effects of 
Alice on Covered Business Method (CBM) Reviews, 14 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 381, 385 
(2017). 
 154 In 2015, Apple and Google, combined, filed forty-one CMBs, twenty-seven percent of all 
CBMs filed that year. Research on file with authors (source: U.S. PTO Statistics, 
https://ptab.uspto.gov/#/external/search [https://perma.cc/R8QL-H5Z8]). In 2018, Apple and 
Google, combined, filed 5 CMBs, fifteen percent of all CBMs filed that year. Id. 
 155 Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., 841 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 156 Secure Axcess, LLC v. PNC Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 848 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
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2.      The Federal Circuit’s Current Interpretation of Section 18 
Just over a year after it decided Versata, the Federal Circuit revisited 
the question of what constitutes a CBM patent and, for reasons that are 
not clear, came to a different conclusion. In Unwired Planet, the patent-
in-suit, U.S. Patent No. 7,203,752 (“‘752 patent”), claims a system of 
restricting access to the location information of a mobile device.157 Patent 
owner Unwired Planet sued Google for patent infringement in 2013, and 
Google responded by petitioning for CBM review, arguing that various 
claims of the patent were invalid under various provisions of the Patent 
Act.158 As in Versata, the PTAB interpreted “covered business method 
patent” broadly and found that the ‘752 patent fell within that definition 
because the patent addressed ways to monetize the claimed invention by 
selling advertising.159 The PTAB then proceeded to invalidate claims of 
the ‘752 patent on § 101 grounds.160 
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the question was how to interpret 
“covered business method patent” as that term is used in section 18(d)—
precisely the question that was decided in Versata.161 Like most other 
federal appellate courts, the Federal Circuit follows the “prior panel rule,” 
which provides that (1) later panels are bound by the holding of earlier 
panels, and (2) if panel decisions conflict, the earlier one controls.162 
Indeed, the Federal Circuit’s Local Rules provide that “only the court en 
banc may overrule a binding precedent . . . .”163 Thus, the Federal Circuit 
 
 157 Unwired Planet, 841 F.3d at 1377. 
 158 Id. at 1378; Petition for Covered Business Method Patent Review of U.S. Patent No. 
7,203,752 under 35 U.S.C. § 321 and § 18 of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Google Inc. 
v. Unwired Planet, LLC., No. CBM2014-00006, 2013 WL 5740664 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 9, 2013). 
 159 Unwired Planet, 841 F.3d at 1379–80. 
 160 Id. at 1378. 
 161 See supra notes 149–51 and accompanying text. 
 162 See Deckers Corp. v. United States, 752 F.3d 949, 959 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“In this Circuit, a 
later panel is bound by the determinations of a prior panel, unless relieved of that obligation by 
an en banc order of the court or a decision of the Supreme Court.”); see also Daniel Kazhdan, 
The Federal Circuit Should Be More Tolerant of Intra-Circuit Splits, 26 FED. CIR. B.J. 105, 138–39 
(2016). Kazhdan argues that the Federal Circuit should relax the prior panel rule to allow intra-
circuit splits and facilitate percolation of patent law issues. Id. at 146–48. Although recognizing 
that the Federal Circuit has allowed intra-circuit splits from time-to-time, he claims that there 
ought to be more splits. Id. at 127–38, 147. 
 163 Fed. Cir. R. 35(a) (en banc determination). 
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should have been bound by Versata’s interpretation of “covered business 
method patent,” as the court recognized it was in SightSound and Blue 
Calypso.164 Instead, the Unwired Planet court conducted a de novo review 
of the issue and held that patents claiming activities “incidental to” or 
“complementary to” financial activities do not qualify as CBM patents.165 
Shortly after Unwired Planet, the Federal Circuit decided Secure 
Axcess v. PNC Bank, another case raising the question of what “covered 
business method patent” means.166 In Secure Axcess, the patent owner 
sued PNC Bank and numerous other financial institutions for infringing 
U.S. Patent No. 7,631,191 (“‘191 patent”), which claims a system and 
method for authenticating a web page.167 The PTAB concluded, as it had 
before, that the ‘191 patent was subject to CBM review because the 
patented invention performs operations that are “incidental to a financial 
activity.”168 After the Board invalidated certain claims of the ‘191 patent, 
Secure Axcess appealed, and the Federal Circuit reversed.169 To justify 
reversal, the court claimed it could ignore Versata because the panel in 
that case did not “opine about where the boundaries of the CBM 
definition lay.”170 Similar to Unwired Planet, the Secure Axcess court then 
went on to hold that defining CBM patents to encompass patents that are 
“incidental to” or “complementary to” financial activity is beyond the 
scope of the statutory language, and thus improper.171 Judge Lourie 
disagreed with this narrow interpretation of CBM patent and wrote a 
dissenting opinion.172 And when the court subsequently denied the 
petition for rehearing en banc, it was once again Judge Lourie (joined by 
Judges Prost, Dyk, Wallach, and Hughes) dissenting because the Secure 
Axcess decision was “contrary to the statutory language, congressional 
intent, and our case law.”173 
 
 164 See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 165 Unwired Planet, 841 F.3d at 1379, 1382. 
 166 Secure Axcess, LLC v. PNC Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 848 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 167 Id. at 1373, 1381. 
 168 Id. at 1380–81. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. at 1380. 
 171 Id. at 1380–81. 
 172 Id. at 1382–86. 
 173 Secure Axcess, LLC v. PNC Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 859 F.3d 998, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
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Why the Federal Circuit came to a different conclusion in Unwired 
Planet and Secure Axcess than it had barely a year earlier in Versata is 
impossible to know for sure. The most obvious explanation is that the 
divergent outcomes are simply a result of a difference in panel 
compositions; yet, there was actually some overlap in the panels, with 
Judge Plager serving on all three.174 Perhaps a better explanation is that 
the court was more inclined to agree with the PTAB in Versata because 
the PTO had intervened in the suit and was a party before the court, 
which was not the situation in Unwired Planet or Secure Axcess.175 Or 
maybe the difference is timing: Versata was decided under the Obama 
administration, which tended to promote policies facilitating patent 
challenges, while Unwired Planet and Secure Axcess were decided after 
President Trump was elected, when patent policy was expected to turn in 
a pro-patent owner direction.176 Whatever the reason, the reality is that 
by ignoring Federal Circuit precedent and affording zero deference to the 
PTO’s interpretation of “covered business method patent,”177 Unwired 
Planet and Secure Axcess narrowed the scope of CBM review. 
 
 174 The Versata panel included Judges Newman, Plager, and Hughes; the Unwired Planet 
panel included Judges Reyna, Plager, and Hughes; and the Secure Axcess panel included Judges 
Lourie, Plager, and Taranto. Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., 841 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 
Versata Dev. Grp., v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 175 Versata, 793 F.3d at 1315. 
 176 See La Belle, supra note 92, at 617. 
 177 The Federal Circuit has recognized, including in Unwired Planet, that Congress granted 
the PTO a “broad delegation of rulemaking authority in the establishment and implementation 
of CBM review.” Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., 841 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Versata, 793 F.3d at 1325). Under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984), and its progeny—including the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016), interpreting a 
different provision of the AIA—where an agency has such authority and the statute “leaves a gap 
or is ambiguous,” the agency has “leeway to enact rules that are reasonable in light of the text, 
nature, and purpose of the statute.” Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2142 (internal quotations omitted). Yet, 
neither Unwired Planet nor Secure Axcess discusses Chevron deference. While Unwired Planet 
includes some Chevron-like language, see, e.g., 841 F.3d at 1381 (“General policy statements, 
however, are not legally binding and, without adopting a policy as a rule through rulemaking an 
agency cannot apply or rely upon a general statement of policy as law.”) (internal quotations 
omitted), Secure Axcess applied a wholly different standard. Secure Axcess, 848 F.3d at 1377 
(“[T]he issue here is whether the Board properly understood the scope of the statutory definition. 
That is a question of law.”). The Federal Circuit’s application of Chevron and its progeny in this 
line of cases and more generally undoubtedly warrants further study, but that is beyond the scope 
of this Article. 
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In May 2018, the Supreme Court vacated Secure Axcess as moot 
because the patents were also canceled in a separate IPR proceeding, 
leaving no live case or controversy between the parties.178 Unwired Planet, 
on the other hand, remains good law and has been followed in some 
PTAB and Federal Circuit cases to deny institution of CBM 
proceedings.179 That leaves us with Versata, SightSound, and Blue Calypso 
supporting a broad interpretation of section 18’s “financial product and 
service” limitation, whereas Unwired Planet finds that a much narrower 
interpretation is appropriate. Thus, the meaning of this provision 
remains unclear.180 But because CBM is set to sunset next year, this 
question may be left unresolved. 
E.      The Future of CBM 
From the start, Congress intended for CBM review—unlike the 
other post-grant proceedings—to be temporary.181 The idea was that 
many bad business method patents were issued in the late 1990s after the 
Federal Circuit decided State Street because too few PTO examiners had 
the requisite expertise to conduct proper prior art searches.182 Congress 
believed that eight years was sufficient to allow any patents that were 
improperly granted during that time period to be challenged. After 
 
 178 PNC Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Secure Axcess, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1982 (2018), vacating as moot 
Secure Axcess, 848 F.3d 1370. 
 179 See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. ContentGuard Holdings, Inc., 740 F. App’x 714, 717 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 
(vacating PTAB’s decision to institute CBM review because “the mere possibility that a patent 
can be used in financial transactions is not enough to make it a CBM patent”); Xerox Corp. v. 
Bytemark, Inc., No. CBM2018-00018, 2018 WL 3414464, at *1 (P.T.A.B. July 12, 2018) (relying 
on Unwired Planet to deny institution because patent does not fall within definition of CBM 
patent); Dennis Crouch, Supreme Court Vacates Secure Axcess Precedent—Finding It Moot, 
PATENTLY-O (May 14, 2018), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/05/supreme-vacates-
precedent.html [https://perma.cc/C4QB-P49M] (“This means that the ‘financial services’ 
limitation of the covered-business-method provisions are again up for interpretation.”). 
 180 See Crouch, supra note 179. 
 181 AIA, sec. 18(a)(3), § 321 note, 125 Stat. at 330. 
 182 GAO REPORT, supra note 87, at 11 n.33. 
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September 2020, when the CBM program is slated to sunset, any 
remaining patents issued in the late 1990s will have expired.183 
Nevertheless, almost immediately after the AIA became effective, 
speculation arose that Congress might extend the CBM program beyond 
September 2020 or perhaps even make it permanent.184 Proponents of 
expanding the CBM program argue that it fills an important void by 
allowing patents to be challenged on any ground, including §§ 101 and 
112, setting it apart from IPRs where only §§ 102 and 103 issues can be 
raised.185 What is more, “old patents” can be challenged in CBM 
proceedings making it much more useful than PGR, which applies only 
to patents granted after the AIA.186 
In May 2013, less than a year after the AIA became effective, Senator 
Schumer proposed legislation to expand the CBM program.187 Senator 
Schumer’s proposal, which ultimately died in committee, not only made 
the CBM program permanent but expanded its scope beyond financial 
patents.188 Perhaps the bill died because, just a couple of months after 
Senator Schumer proposed it, the PTAB interpreted the scope of the term 
“covered business method patent” broadly in Versata, thus rendering 
legislative action unnecessary.189 To be sure, in the wake of the PTAB’s 
Versata decision, the number of CBM petitions peaked with 177 filed in 
2014, followed by 151 in 2015, and 92 in 2016.190 
 
 183 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (providing that the term of a patent “begin[s] on the date on 
which the patent issues and end[s] 20 years from the date on which the application for the patent 
was filed in the United States . . .”). 
 184 See, e.g., Tony Dutra, Schumer Seeks Expanded, Challenges to CBM Patents, Invokes Troll 
Specter, BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 7, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/
blaw/document/XEM8JCQO000000? criteria_id=4608904ee3804d74ba7692821b741864&
searchGuid=4b70c65f-c0d6-4695-8323-7ad423b53801 [https://perma.cc/AC5J-J7XX]. 
 185 See, e.g., Jeffrey C. Totten & Jonathan R.K. Stroud, Senate Bill Proposes Expansion of Post-
Grant Review of Business Methods, FINNEGAN AIA BLOG (May 15, 2013), 
https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/blogs/america-invents-act/senate-bill-proposes-
expansion-of-post-grant-review-of-business-methods.html [https://perma.cc/5V9S-QSYP]. 
 186 GAO REPORT, supra note 87, at 40. 
 187 Patent Quality Improvement Act of 2013, S. 866, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 188 Id. § 2. 
 189 See supra notes 123–25. 
 190 Research on file with authors (source: U.S. PTO Statistics, https://ptab.uspto.gov/#/
external/search [https://perma.cc/R8QL-H5Z8]). 
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The number of CBM petitions began to taper off significantly in 
2017, with only 52 petitions, and that downward trend continued in 2018 
when only 33 CBM petitions were filed and again in 2019 with only 21 
CBM petitions.191 Various explanations have been offered for this decline. 
Some point to the Federal Circuit’s decisions in Unwired Planet and 
Secure Axcess, which, as discussed above, substantially narrowed the 
category of patents subject to CBM review.192 Others argue that CBM 
review has accomplished its goal, meaning the bad business method 
patents issued post-State Street have been canceled.193 Still others 
postulate that owners of financial patents are making a strategic decision 
to wait until after the CBM program expires to enforce their patents.194 
Finally, in light of recent developments making it more difficult to 
challenge patents on § 101 grounds,195 perhaps challengers are relying 
more on IPR to challenge patents under §§ 102 and 103. 
Despite these dwindling numbers, Congress held hearings in March 
2018 to consider whether it should extend or make permanent the CBM 
program.196 The witnesses included Aaron Cooper, Vice President of 
Global Policy at BSA/The Software Alliance; David Hale, Chief Privacy 
Officer and Deputy General Counsel at TD Ameritrade; and John 
Neumann, Director of Natural Resources and Environment at the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO).197 Not unexpectedly, BSA 
opposes any extension of the CBM program because Congress intended 
it to be transitional, its objective has been accomplished, and the program 
“puts a cloud over patents on software-related inventions.”198 TD 
Ameritrade, on the other hand, supports making the CBM program 
permanent because IPR and PGR are not viable alternatives for 
 
 191 Id. 
 192 GAO REPORT, supra note 87, at 18. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. at 19. 
 195 See infra Section V.B (discussing recent developments on § 101). 
 196 Assessing the Effectiveness of the Transitional Program for Covered Business Method 
Patents: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intell. Prop., and the Internet of the Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (2018). 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. at 9 (statement of Aaron Cooper); BSA, HEARING ON “ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS 
OF THE TRANSITIONAL PROGRAM FOR COVERED BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS” 6 (2018), https://
docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU03/20180320/108034/HHRG-115-JU03-Wstate-CooperA-
20180320.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5QN-7V28]. 
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challenging the bad business method patents.199 Yet, it is the testimony of 
the GAO Director that likely had the most sway with Congress. 
Shortly before the hearings, the GAO produced a report assessing 
the CBM program based on PTAB trial data from September 2012 
through September 2017, various PTO documents, and interviews with 
almost forty stakeholders, including patent owners, patent challengers, 
attorneys appearing before the PTAB, technology trade groups, public 
interest groups, legal and academic commentators, and venture 
capitalists.200 The report reached a number of key conclusions, including, 
but not limited to, the following: (1) of the 300 or so patents challenged 
through CBM, in one-third of the cases, at least one of the claims was 
invalidated;201 (2) use of CBM declined over time; and (3) stakeholders 
generally agree that CBM proceedings have contributed to a decrease in 
litigation involving business method patents and that some aspects of the 
program should be maintained past 2020.202 In the end, however, the 
GAO did not recommend making the CBM program permanent or 
extending it in any way.203 This is not particularly surprising since, at least 
as early as 2015, the PTO recommended that Congress allow the CBM 
program to expire as scheduled.204 
The GAO Report does not focus on who the petitioners have been in 
CBM proceedings. When it was proposed and initially adopted, the CBM 
program was seen as a “bailout” for the banks.205 One therefore would 
expect financial institutions to be heavy users of CBM proceedings. To 
test this hypothesis, we examined all 589 of the section 18 proceedings 
 
 199 See supra note 196, at 7–9 (statement of David Hale). 
 200 GAO REPORT, supra note 87, at 4. 
 201 Id. at 23; see also id. at 19–20 (discussing the fact that the number of petitions filed is not 
necessarily equal to the number of patents subject to challenge). 
 202 GAO Report, supra note 87, at 17, 34. 
 203 Id. at 42 (stating that the only recommendation is that the PTO develop guidance for judges 
reviewing PTAB decisions and processes that lead to the decisions). 
 204 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., STUDY AND REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
LEAHY-SMITH AMERICA INVENTS ACT 39 (2015), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/Report_on_Implementation_of_the_AIA_September2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BSQ3-E997]. 
 205 See Michel, supra note 97. 
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from September 2012 through the first quarter of 2020 to determine the 
extent of financial institutions’ involvement in the CBM program.206 
An examination of CBMs involving all financial services firms207 
does not reveal commanding numbers. During the period we studied, 
financial services firms were petitioners in a total of 118 CBMs, 
representing 20% of all CBMs. Of those 118, banks were petitioners in 45, 
or 7% of all CBMs. Contrast these numbers with those of technology 
companies: Apple alone filed more CBMs—54—than all the banks put 
together. Google alone filed 44 CBMs. 
While these numbers do not appear significant, examination of 
CBMs may implicate some changes in intra-industry litigation practices. 
As discussed, it comes as no surprise that financial services firms would 
take advantage of CBM proceedings as petitioners. Furthermore, it is not 
surprising that generally the respondents in such proceedings are not 
financial institutions.208 What is most surprising is that there are a 
handful of CBMs against financial services firms. This is surprising given 
that historically banks and other financial services firms did not patent 
their innovations and therefore did not have patents to protect in 
litigation. This also suggests that the uptick in patent activity that we 
observed in our 2014 study may involve more than defensive patenting.209 
In all of the CBMs in which a financial services firm is a respondent, 
the petitioner is also a financial services firm. International Securities 
Exchange, LLC was petitioner in several CBMs in which Chicago Board 
Option Exchange was respondent.210 Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. was 
petitioner in several CBMs in which Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. 
 
 206  Research on file with authors (source: U.S. PTO Statistics, https://ptab.uspto.gov/#/
external/search [https://perma.cc/R8QL-H5Z8]). 
 207 Our statistics regarding all financial services firms should be regarded as estimates only 
because we had to exercise significant discretion in deciding whether a firm (particularly those 
that are privately held) is engaged in financial services. 
 208 Since CBM was supposed to address the “patent troll” problem for banks, one would expect 
most respondents to be non-practicing entities (NPEs). 
 209 La Belle & Schooner, supra note 23, at 442. 
 210 Int’l Sec. Exch., LLC, v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., No. CBM2013-00049, 2015 WL 
930203 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 2, 2015); Int’l Sec. Exch., LLC, v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., No. 
CBM2013-00050, 2015 WL 930204 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 2, 2015); Int’l Sec. Exch., LLC, v. Chi. Bd. 
Options Exch., Inc., No. CBM2013-00051, 2015 WL 930205 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 2, 2015). 
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was respondent.211 The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta filed CBMs 
against Bozeman Financial LLC.212 Both Miami International Holdings 
and Investors Exchange filed a number of CBMs against NASDAQ.213 
Most important for purposes of our study of banks’ patent activities, 
in the first quarter of 2019, Wells Fargo filed CBMs against USAA.214 
These CBMs arise out of the first bank-on-bank patent litigation which is 
discussed in detail in Part V. 
 
 211 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. CBM2012-00003, 2014 WL 651401 
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 11, 2014); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. CBM2012-00004, 
2014 WL 2213411 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 23, 2014); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. 
CBM2012-00002, 2014 WL 1260851 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 23, 2014); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive 
Cas. Ins. Co., No. CBM2013-00001 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 27, 2013); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive 
Cas. Ins. Co., No. CBM2012-00011 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 25, 2013). 
 212 Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta v. Bozeman Fin. LLC, No. CBM2017-00035, 2018 WL 
3571111 (P.T.A.B. July 23, 2018); Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta v. Bozeman Fin. LLC, No. 
CBM2017-00036, 2018 WL 3570874 (P.T.A.B. July 23, 2018). 
 213 Miami Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Ften, Inc., No. CBM2018-00020, 2019 WL 5092479 (P.T.A.B. 
Oct. 10, 2019); Miami Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Nasdaq, Inc., No. CBM2018-00029, 2019 WL 
5070457 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 9, 2019); Miami Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Nasdaq, Inc., No. CBM2018-00030, 
2019 WL 4896642 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 3, 2019); Miami Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Nasdaq, Inc., No. 
CBM2018-00031, 2019 WL 4855509 (P.T.A.B. Oct.1, 2019); Miami Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Nasdaq 
Ise, LLC, No. CBM2018-00021, 2019 WL 4855629 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 1, 2019); Miami Int’l Holdings, 
Inc. v. Nasdaq, Inc., No. CBM2018-00032, 2019 WL 5993350 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 14, 2018); Miami 
Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Nasdaq, Inc., No. CBM2018-00028 (Aug. 5, 2018); Inv’rs Exch. LLC v. 
Nasdaq, Inc., No. CBM2018-00045, CBM2019-00001, 2020 WL 1696147 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 7, 2020); 
Inv’rs Exch. LLC v. Nasdaq, Inc., No. CBM2018-00039, 2020 WL 907811 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 25, 2020); 
Inv’rs Exch. LLC v. Nasdaq, Inc., No. CBM2018-00042, 2019 WL 1294135 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 18, 
2019); Inv’rs Exch. LLC v. Nasdaq, Inc., No. CBM2018-00041, 2019 WL 413635 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 
31, 2019); Inv’rs Exch. LLC v. Nasdaq, Inc., No. CBM2018-00038, 2019 WL 323691 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 
22, 2019). 
 214 Wells Fargo Bank v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, No. CBM2019-00027, 2019 WL 4855511 
(P.T.A.B. Oct. 1, 2019); Wells Fargo Bank v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, No. CBM2019-00029, 
2019 WL 4855342 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 1, 2019); Wells Fargo Bank v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, No. 
CBM2019-00028, 2019 WL 4855339 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 1, 2019); Wells Fargo Bank v. United Servs. 
Auto. Ass’n, No. CBM2019-00003 (P.T.A.B. June 3, 2019); Wells Fargo Bank v. United Servs. 
Auto. Ass’n, No. CBM2019-00005, 2019 WL 2361775 (P.T.A.B. June 3, 2019); Wells Fargo Bank 
v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, No. CBM2019-00004 (P.T.A.B. May 15, 2019); Wells Fargo Bank v. 
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, No. CBM2019-00002 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 26, 2019). 
LABELLE.SCHOONER.42.1.2 (Do Not Delete) 1/13/21  10:37 AM 
312 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1 
 
IV.      THE RISE OF FINTECH AND FINTECH PATENTS 
After a long period in which the world of finance tended to thrive 
outside the world of patents and patent litigation, we see a change in the 
landscape deriving from two simultaneous trends. First is the rise in 
fintech as the latest form of financial innovation. The growing emphasis 
on high technology as the driver of financial innovation has brought new 
players into financial services. Jamie Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan Chase, 
famously told his shareholders in 2015, “Silicon Valley is coming.”215 
With Silicon Valley comes greater reliance on and sophistication with the 
patent system. These developments are discussed in Part IV. Second is a 
change in patent litigation. We see some initial signs of a shift in patent 
litigation involving financial products, a move away from third-party 
suits toward litigation between competitors, i.e., bank-on-bank litigation 
in CBM and in federal court. The changes in patent litigation are the topic 
of Part V. 
A.      Rise of Fintech 
The Financial Stability Board (FSB)216 defines fintech “as 
technologically enabled innovation in financial services that could result 
in new business models, applications, processes or products with an 
associated material effect on financial markets and institutions and the 
provision of financial services.”217 The following discussion examines 
how fintech relates to the historical landscape of financial innovation and 
how fintech is transforming financial services. 
As discussed in Part I, innovation has a long and significant history 
in the development of the financial services industry. Traditional 
definitions of financial innovation focus on newness coupled with 
 
 215 Alyson Shontell, Jamie Dimon: Silicon Valley Startups are Coming to Eat Wall Street’s 
Lunch, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 10, 2015, 9:02 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/jamie-dimon-
shareholder-letter-and-silicon-valley-2015-4 [https://perma.cc/7NQH-WCS5]. 
 216 See infra note 244 (defining Financial Stability Board). 
 217 Monitoring of FinTech, FIN. STABILITY BD., https://www.fsb.org/work-of-the-fsb/policy-
development/additional-policy-areas/monitoring-of-fintech [https://perma.cc/9L3H-ZCNB]. 
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widespread adoption218 and on cost savings and risk reduction.219 To be 
sure, fintech can be seen as a type of traditional financial innovation, i.e., 
financial innovation that is technology-driven. Seen this way, as a subset 
of a broader category of financial innovation, fintech can be distinguished 
from other important financial product innovations. For example, the 
creation of the credit default swap (CDS)220 was supported, but certainly 
not driven, by technology. Rather, a CDS is an insurance-like contractual 
innovation that falls squarely within the traditional definitions of 
financial innovation because of its newness, widespread adoption, and 
potential for cost savings and risk reduction.221 On the other hand, other 
important historical financial innovations have been driven by 
technological advances. The automatic teller machine (ATM), for 
example, was a technological innovation that transformed retail 
banking.222 
Was the ATM a fintech innovation in its time? Using the FSB 
definition of fintech,223 the ATM was certainly a technological innovation 
that had a material effect on the provision of financial services.224 Still, 
some might reject the idea of the ATM as a form of fintech because in 
their view fintech is a form of financial innovation that disrupts existing 
financial services and is fueled by innovators who are new to the financial 
 
 218 See supra Part I (discussing often cited definition developed by Peter Tufano). 
 219 See supra Part I (discussing often cited definition developed by W. Scott Frame and 
Lawrence White). 
 220 See supra Part I (discussing the creation of the credit default swap). 
 221 Of course, the CDS earned its infamy for enhancing risk during the Financial Crisis. For a 
discussion of recent CDS developments, see Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Engineered Credit Default 
Swaps: Innovative or Manipulative?, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1073 (2019). 
 222 See Bernardo Bátiz-Lazo, A Brief History of the ATM, ATLANTIC (Mar. 26, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/03/a-brief-history-of-the-atm/388547 
[https://perma.cc/XS6Q-KQES] (examining the impact of the ATM on retail banking). 
 223 See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
 224 John Schindler, an economist at the Federal Reserve, writes that the advantage of the FSB 
definition is that “it captures only technology-enabled financial innovation with a ‘material effect’ 
on financial markets, institutions, and services—minor uses of technology are not counted.” John 
Schindler, FinTech and Financial Innovation: Drives and Depth 2 (Fin. and Econ. Discussion 
Series Div. of Res. & Stat. & Monetary Aff., Working Paper No. 2017-081), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2017081pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4QR-
VDHY]. 
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sector.225 The invention of the ATM does not fit neatly within this 
narrower vision since so many lay claim to the title of the ATM inventor 
(making it difficult to pinpoint the source),226 and, in any event, the 
invention was not disruptive to the banking business model.227 Finally, 
some critics would simply reject the questions regarding the nature of 
fintech because they view fintech as little more than a branding 
opportunity targeted at the millennial demographic.228 
Putting ATM analogies aside (with more on the ATM later)229 most 
observers, like the FSB, adopt a broad meaning for fintech and seem to 
direct attention to the newness and significance of the technology or 
application.230 Therefore, fintech innovations are identified across all 
sectors of finance.231 In credit markets, for example, marketplace lenders 
(e.g., LendingClub, Kabbage, Amazon Lending) use online platforms to 
lend, directly or indirectly, to consumers and small businesses. Peer-to-
peer lending platforms (e.g., Upstart, Funding Circle) connect borrowers 
with lenders, eliminating the services of traditional banks or financial 
 
 225 Maurizio Raffone, Financial Innovation vs FinTech, MEDIUM (Jan. 1, 2018), 
https://medium.com/@maurizio.raffone/financial-innovation-vs-fintech-fcd8f54d4aa6 
[https://perma.cc/YBY6-YM5U]. 
 226 See Anthony Miller, Who Invented the ATM? Part 1, ATM INVENTOR (2011), 
http://atminventor.com [https://perma.cc/6HFB-S6DF]. 
 227 For background on the development of the ATM, see Linda Rodriguez McRobbie, The 
ATM is Dead. Long. Live the ATM!, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Jan. 8, 2015) 
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/atm-dead-long-live-atm-180953838 
[https://perma.cc/7FK5-7R57]. 
 228 Jemima Kelly of The Financial Times has made this point in several articles. Jemima Kelly, 
Is the Fintech Bubble Bursting? FIN. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2019), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2019/11/29/
1575025278000/Is-the-fintech-bubble-bursting [https://perma.cc/APW7-FG66]; Jemima Kelly, 
Can We Please Stop Adding “Tech” to Stuff? FIN. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2019), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/
2019/08/02/1564735232000/Can-we-please-stop-adding—tech—to-stuff. [https://perma.cc/
L5YG-Q46G]. Kelly points out the absurdity of fintech relative terms such as “regtech” 
(technology that addresses financial regulation), and “suptech” (technology that supports 
supervisory agencies). Id. 
 229 See infra Section IV.B (discussing fintech patents). 
 230 Schindler argues that a feature of many fintech innovations is the “depth of innovation,” 
which he defines as a greater ability of the innovation to transform financial services. See 
Schindler, supra note 224, at 7–10. 
 231 For a discussion of fintech developments, see BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. 
ON BANKING SUPERVISION SOUND PRACTICES: IMPLICATIONS OF FINTECH DEVELOPMENTS FOR 
BANKS AND BANK SUPERVISORS 4–5 (2018), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d431.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J8K2-8YMY]. 
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institutions. Payment services have been transformed by mobile wallets 
(e.g., Apple Pay, Google Pay, PayPal) and peer-to-peer transfers (e.g., 
Venmo, Square, Zelle). Investment management services have embraced 
innovations like digital wealth management platforms (e.g., Folio, SigFig) 
that use algorithms to provide customers with investment and financial 
advice.232 In addition to fintech innovations that directly impact banking 
and other financial services, many new technologies with non-financial 
applications have important implications for financial services. Cloud 
computing, distributed ledger technology, artificial intelligence, and even 
IoT are transforming finance. 
A diverse set of firms make up the world of fintech, each having 
relative strengths and weaknesses. Large technology companies (e.g., 
Apple, Google) and big banks (e.g., JP Morgan, Bank of America) are 
obvious major players given the resources they control. Large tech firms, 
moreover, benefit from their existing expertise in development and 
culture of innovation. Banks, on the other hand, have significant 
regulatory advantages. For example, only chartered banks can offer 
deposit accounts,233 which gives banks a natural advantage in many 
financial services, particularly those involving payment systems. In 
addition, banks (particularly federally chartered banks) are also 
unhindered by thorny compliance issues arising from operations across 
fifty states.234 
Looking beyond large institutions, fintech startups have been most 
widely seen as the key disruptors. Certainly, over the last ten years, the 
growth of fintech startups has been significant. A Deloitte study shows, 
however, that the number of new fintech startups is decreasing, after 
seeing its peak in 2014.235 On the banking side, small community banks 
certainly lack the resources to compete with large banks, but many 
community banks are riding the technology wave by partnering with 
 
 232 See, e.g., DIV. INV. MGMT., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IM GUIDANCE UPDATE (No. 2017-
02, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/investment/im-guidance-2017-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/784N-
MJH5] (SEC-issued advice on robo-advisors). 
 233 12 U.S.C. § 1813(l)(1) (2018). 
 234 See generally Brian Knight, Federalism and Federalization on the Fintech Frontier, 20 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 129 (2017). 
 235 DELOITTE CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS., FINTECH BY THE NUMBERS 3 (2017), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/tr/Documents/financial-services/dcfs-fintech-
by-the-numbers.pdf [https://perma.cc/86PU-FEBY]. 
LABELLE.SCHOONER.42.1.2 (Do Not Delete) 1/13/21  10:37 AM 
316 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1 
 
fintech startups.236 Startups offer the community banks the chance to 
replace dated technology and thereby attract new customers.237 
Community banks offer startups access to an existing customer base and 
the ability to offer banking services that are prohibited to nonbanks.238 In 
addition, community banks’ small size means that they can react more 
quickly than their Wall Street counterparts which can be appealing to 
fast-paced startup firms.239 
Banks and technology firms, large and small, are not the only firms 
interested in fintech. Consumer retailers have much to gain by finding 
ways, for example, to take control over (and away from banks) customer 
payments. Walmart has a long history of searching for innovative 
payment solutions. In 2005, Wal-Mart Bank, a proposed Utah industrial 
loan bank, filed an application with the FDIC for federal deposit 
insurance.240 While that application was ultimately withdrawn amidst 
growing opposition,241 Wal-Mart Bank was just one step in Walmart’s 
long search for innovative payment solutions that today takes the form of 
Walmart Pay, a mobile payment application. While Walmart Pay is 
linked to traditional bank payment systems (i.e., debit and credit cards), 
Walmart’s interest in mobile payments seems motivated by improving 
customer experience by easing the checkout process.242 Starbucks offers 
another example of a retailer’s use of fintech innovation. Starbucks’s 
mobile app combines its loyalty program with mobile ordering and 
payment. The combination of customer-friendly features has made the 
 
 236 Kate Rooney, Small Banks You’ve Never Heard of Are Quietly Enabling the Tech Turnover 
of the Financial Industry, CNBC (Feb. 15, 2019, 3:11 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/15/
small-banks-youve-never-heard-of-quietly-power-the-booming-fintech-industry--.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y53L-XSDE]. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Application for Deposit Insurance for Wal-Mart Bank, 71 Fed. Reg. 10,531–32 (Mar. 1, 
2006). 
 241 See generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking and 
Commerce, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1539, 1544–48 (2007). 
 242 Id. at 1544–45. 
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Starbucks app the most widely used loyalty app in the restaurant chain 
industry.243 
Consideration of the rise of fintech raises concerns for financial 
stability. To be sure, one of the frequently cited culprits of the 2008–2009 
Financial Crisis is financial innovation run amok. On the other hand, the 
devastation in the wake of the crisis may have unleased the innovation 
since that time as customers reevaluated their relationship with 
established firms and new entrants attempted to fill the void. The 
question remains whether any of the current or future fintech 
innovations will pose a threat to future financial stability. The FSB244 
released a white paper examining the financial stability implications of 
fintech.245 The FSB noted important limitations to its study given that 
relatively little data is currently available.246 Still, the FSB concluded “that 
there are currently no compelling financial stability risks from emerging 
FinTech innovations.”247 Since the publication of its 2017 report, the FSB 
has continued to monitor the financial stability implications of fintech.248 
B.      Fintech Patents 
Recall that conventional wisdom suggested that banks did not 
patent. That changed with developments in the patentability of business 
methods and banks’ business practices. What we see as potentially 
important about current patent activity lies in the significance of the 
patents themselves. Industry-changing products, like collateralized debt 
obligations, are generally not patentable.249 While a new financial product 
 
 243 David Oragui, The Success of Starbucks App: A Case Study, MEDIUM: MANIFEST (June 12, 
2018), https://themanifest.com/mobile-apps/success-starbucks-app-case-study 
[https://perma.cc/W42A-98GA]. 
 244 The FSB is an international organization established to promote coordination and 
standard setting among national financial authorities. See About the FSB, FIN. STABILITY BD., 
http://www.fsb.org/about [https://perma.cc/LEX4-93D2]. 
 245 FIN. STABILITY BD., FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS FROM FINTECH (2017), 
http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/R270617.pdf [https://perma.cc/CPN8-9WTB]. 
 246 Id. at 1. 
 247 Id. 
 248 Monitoring of FinTech, supra note 217. 
 249 Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets, 2 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 262 (2012). 
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idea is not patentable, the systems and methods supporting such products 
might be.250 Given the burst in technological innovation in fintech, we see 
the potential for patented innovations to play a crucial role in the future 
of finance. In defining fintech as discussed above, the availability of 
patent protection is an important additional factor in assessing whether 
a technology deserves the extra attention typically afforded to fintech. 
Recall the discussion above of the ATM as an early form of fintech. 
Notably, a patented invention was necessary in the development of the 
ATM. The British government issued a patent for technology that 
supported the personal identification number (PIN). The ATM could not 
develop without the PIN.251 
We observed in our 2014 study that banks were increasing their 
patent activity. We postulated that this could be merely a defensive move, 
i.e., that banks were increasing their patent holdings in response to 
litigation by non-practicing entities (NPEs). We now see evidence that 
banks and other financial institutions may be using patents in the more 
traditional way—to protect valuable innovation and capture the full value 
of their investment. This shift may also be explained or accelerated by the 
emergence of patent litigation between banks and between other financial 
institutions. Of course, it’s a classic chicken-or-egg story: did banks 
increase their patent holdings in response to increased litigation or did 
litigation increase because of banks’ larger patent holdings? Whatever the 
cause, the discussion below examines who leads in fintech patents. 
As discussed above, participants in fintech innovation are diverse. 
The same goes for patent owners. The universe includes big tech, fintech 
startups, big banks, community banks, and retailers. Because fintech 
encompasses so many types of innovations, there are many ways to view 
the question of which firms appear to dominate. At the broadest level, 
large technology firms eclipse banks in overall patent holdings. All banks 
combined own less than a quarter of IBMs granted and pending patent 
families.252 This comes as no surprise given technology companies’ long 
history with using patents to protect their intellectual property compared 
with the banks’ relatively recent interest in patent protection. In terms of 
 
 250 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,078,521 (filed Dec. 13, 2011). 
 251 Schindler, supra note 224, at 3. 
 252 CIPHER, IP STRATEGY REPORT 18 (2018), https://cipher.ai/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/
Cipher-IP-Strategy-Report-2018-min-min_compressed.pdf [https://perma.cc/FD38-KQV3]. 
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individual bank holdings, Bank of America stands way ahead of its big 
bank competitors. Bank of America holds 2,547 patents with JP Morgan 
Chase as the next largest owner with 515 patents.253 Among the patents 
owned by banks, IT infrastructure, online and mobile banking, and 
transaction data processing account for the vast majority of patents.254 
With regard to fintech patents in particular, a 2015 study listed the 
following companies as the top five holders of fintech patents: Visa 
(1,342), Bank of America (1,052), Hitachi (1,048), Shinhan Bank (907), 
and Bizmodeline (867).255 This list represents significant diversity. Visa is 
a financial institution that provides its member financial institutions with 
branded payment products (e.g., debit, credit cards). Bank of America is 
the second largest U.S. bank. Hitachi is a Japanese conglomerate. Shinhan 
Bank is a large South Korean bank. Bizmodeline is another South Korean 
company with significant patent holdings. Large tech firms in this study 
included IBM (747) ranked eighth, and Microsoft (476) ranked 
sixteenth.256 This study also identified fintech startups’ patent holdings, 
with Square holding the most at 143.257 
Drilling down further to specific types of fintech patents, we also see 
diverse holdings. Blockchain and other distributed ledger technologies 
(DLT) are an important fintech subcategory. DLT has numerous 
applications in finance beyond its most popular application facilitating 
the transfer and recording of cryptocurrencies. DLT has the potential to 
eliminate inefficiencies in payments, clearing, and settlement of a diverse 
array of financial transactions. Patent activity in this area reflects the 
importance of this innovation. A 2016 study found at least seventy-two 
U.S. patent applications involving cryptocurrency and blockchain 
inventions.258 That study identified Bank of America as the top filer and 
 
 253 Id. at 17. 
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 255 RELECURA, FINTECH: AN IP PERSPECTIVE 7 (2015), https://relecura.com/2020/04/15/
fintech-an-intellectual-property-perspective [https://perma.cc/M6ZH-BGKU]. 
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also listed filings by American Express, eBay, Goldman Sachs, IBM, JP 
Morgan Chase, PayPal, Visa, and Wells Fargo.259 
Mobile payments technology is thriving. A 2017 study showed Visa 
and Mastercard topping the list of mobile payments patents holders with 
327 and 308 patented inventions each.260 Bank of America and 
Bizmodeline hold third and fourth place with 260 and 246 patented 
inventions each.261 PayPal is in fifth with 145.262 As discussed in Part V, 
mobile payments technology may become an important source of 
litigation activity. We saw in Part III that Apple and Google individually 
filed more CBMs than all financial institutions combined. Google and 
Apple are also significant patent holders in mobile payments technology, 
ranking eleventh and thirteenth respectively in the 2017 study.263 
Owning patents is, of course, only the beginning of the story. A 
patented innovation that never sees wide adoption is hardly worth our 
notice. On the other hand, patented innovations that spur litigation can 
forecast lasting changes to the industry and the services it provides. For 
this reason, we explore next the possible early signs of a bank-on-bank 
patent war. 
V.      BANK-ON-BANK PATENT WARS 
As discussed in our 2014 study, although banks did not traditionally 
rely on patents to protect their innovations, that began to change after the 
Federal Circuit decided State Street. In the early years, financial 
institutions were patenting primarily for defensive purposes—meaning 
to ward off infringement suits. Recent developments suggest, however, 
that trends may be shifting as banks go on the offensive to enforce their 
patent rights. This Part explores the history of patent wars in this country, 
discusses USAA v. Wells Fargo—the first bank-on-bank patent 
 
 259 Id. at 5. 
 260 Vivek Sharma, Mobile Payments: FinTech vs. Non-FinTech Patent Landscape, 
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litigation—and then considers whether that case signals a fintech patent 
war to come. 
A.      Patent Wars of the Past 
In 2018, headlines from around the globe proclaimed that the 
smartphone wars were finally over, as Apple and Samsung had reached a 
settlement agreement bringing their seven-year, highly-publicized patent 
dispute to an end.264 For many, the prolonged litigation between the tech 
giants was the first and only patent war they knew anything about. In 
reality, patent wars are not a modern phenomenon but—like patents 
themselves—have been around for a very long time.265 
The first wave of patent wars in the United States came with the 
Industrial Revolution, during which American society transitioned from 
agrarian and rural to largely industrial and urban.266 The revolution began 
with the opening of textile and cotton mills in New England in the 1790s 
and steadily spread to other parts of the young nation.267 The next century 
was marked by the introduction of disruptive technologies such as the 
sewing machine, telephone, and light bulb that ultimately became the 
subject of major patent wars.268 
Today, the name “Singer” is synonymous with sewing machines. Yet 
it was Elias Howe, not Isaac Merritt Singer, who invented and was 
awarded a patent for the sewing machine in 1846.269 Rather than taking a 
license and paying fees, Singer and several other competitors patented 
 
 264 See, e.g., Ellen Daniel, Is the Apple and Samsung Patent War Finally Over?, VERDICT (June 
29, 2018, 2:42 PM), https://www.verdict.co.uk/apple-and-samsung-patent-war 
[https://perma.cc/A32M-57LV]; Nicas, supra note 4; Samsung, Apple Reach Settlement over 
Design Dispute, KOREA TIMES (June 28, 2018, 5:03 PM), https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/
tech/2020/01/133_251391.html [https://perma.cc/4ZRC-QB2U]. 
 265 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER BEAUCHAMP, INVENTED BY LAW: ALEXANDER GRAHAM BELL AND 
THE PATENT THAT CHANGED AMERICA 1–10 (2015); Mossoff, supra note 5, at 465. 
 266 Mossoff, supra note 5, at 457. 
 267 History.com Eds., Industrial Revolution, HISTORY (Sept. 9, 2019), 
https://www.history.com/topics/industrial-revolution/industrial-revolution [https://perma.cc/
B2JB-P4YW]. 
 268  Mossoff, supra note 5, at 466. 
 269 Alex Palmer, How Singer Won the Sewing Machine War, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (July 14, 
2015), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/how-singer-won-sewing-
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their own sewing machines that allegedly improved upon Howe’s original 
invention.270 The result was a situation known today as a “patent thicket,” 
where numerous patents owned by different entities cover the same 
product.271 Because patent thickets frustrate commercialization, the 
parties turned to the courts for a resolution. The first round of lawsuits 
began in 1852 when Howe sued Singer.272 Within a couple of years, Howe 
and Singer reached an agreement, joined forces, and started suing other 
competitors.273 After dozens of lawsuits were filed, the parties ultimately 
resolved their dispute by creating the first patent pool whereby they 
combined their patents and split the licensing revenue.274 
Two other major patent wars of the nineteenth century likewise 
involved transformative inventions: the telephone and the light bulb. The 
telephone war involved well-known figures like Alexander Graham Bell 
and Thomas Edison.275 Initially, though, the dispute was between Bell and 
Elisha Gray, who both allegedly applied for a patent on the same 
telephone technology on the same day in 1876.276 But it was Bell who was 
ultimately determined to be the first inventor and granted the patent.277 
Extensive litigation ensued, with Bell and his associates ultimately filing 
close to 600 patent infringement suits.278 In the end, Bell’s campaign was 
successful and helped create one of the most powerful monopolies in 
history, which had long-lasting effects on the telecommunications 
industry in the United States.279 
Edison, of course, also played a central role in the patent war over 
the light bulb. It is commonly believed that Edison invented the light 
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 271 Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard 
Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120–22 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & 
Scott Stern eds., 2001), https://www.nber.org/chapters/c10778.pdf [https://perma.cc/D4A2-
Y2U4]. 
 272 Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The Sewing Machine 
Wars of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 182–85 (2011). 
 273 See id. at 190–91. 
 274 Id. at 194–96. 
 275 See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP, supra note 265, at 109–10. 
 276 Id. at 40–42, 67. 
 277 Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 720–22 (2012). 
 278 BEAUCHAMP, supra note 265, at 12, 74. 
 279 Id. at 1–10. 
LABELLE.SCHOONER.42.1.2 (Do Not Delete) 1/13/21  10:37 AM 
2020] FINTECH: NEW BATTLE LINES 323 
 
bulb, but the story is not quite so simple.280 A primitive version of the light 
bulb had been around for decades when Edison and his team patented a 
commercially viable system of interior lighting in the late 1870s.281 
Because Edison faced fierce competition in the lighting market, however, 
a patent war erupted. For fifteen years, Edison vigorously litigated his 
patent portfolio and ultimately emerged triumphant.282 To be sure, by 
1910 General Electric—the successor to Edison’s companies—controlled 
ninety-seven percent of all light bulbs sold in the United States, so waging 
war appears to have paid off.283 
The turn of the century brought with it a new round of patent wars, 
this time focusing on the automobile and aviation industries.284 In 1895, 
the Patent Office granted U.S. Patent No. 549,160 (“‘160 patent”), titled 
“Road Engine,” to attorney George Selden and ignited a patent war 
among car manufacturers.285 The problem with the Selden patent was that 
it was pending at the PTO for sixteen years, so by the time it issued, the 
technology was in widespread use.286 The Selden patent, in other words, 
was what is referred to today as a “submarine” patent, whereby applicants 
use delay tactics at the PTO and then surprise a mature market with a 
patent that nobody knew anything about.287 
A few years after the ‘160 patent was issued, Selden assigned it to the 
Electric Vehicle Company, which then launched an enforcement 
 
 280 Lea Shaver, Illuminating Innovation: From Patent Racing to Patent War, 69 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1891, 1910 (2012). 
 281 Id. at 1910–11. 
 282 Id. 
 283 Id. 
 284 See, e.g., Daniel S. Sternberg, A Brief History of RAND, 20 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 211, 217–
220 (2014). 
 285 See WILLIAM GREENLEAF, MONOPOLY ON WHEELS: HENRY FORD AND THE SELDEN 
AUTOMOBILE PATENT 87–89, 148–54 (1961); Donna Harris, Landmark Patent Case Broke 
Selden’s Lock on Auto Industry, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (June 16, 2003, 1:00 AM), 
https://www.autonews.com/article/20030616/SUB/306160708/landmark-patent-case-broke-
selden-s-lock-on-auto-industry [https://perma.cc/CV7L-9GPB]. 
 286 Elec. Vehicle Co. v. C.A. Duerr & Co., 172 F. 923, 924 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909), rev’d sub nom. 
Columbia Motor Car Co. v. C.A. Duerr & Co., 184 F. 893 (2d Cir. 1911). 
 287 Michael A. Carrier & Carl. J. Minniti III, Biologics: The New Antitrust Frontier, 2018 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1, 38 (2018). Since 1995, the vast majority of patent applications must be made public 
eighteen months after filing, which has significantly reduced—although not completely 
eliminated—the “submarine” patent problem in the United States. Id. at 39–40. 
LABELLE.SCHOONER.42.1.2 (Do Not Delete) 1/13/21  10:37 AM 
324 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1 
 
campaign against numerous automobile manufacturers.288 Similar to the 
sewing machine, the parties ultimately settled their dispute through a 
pooling arrangement pursuant to which members joined the Association 
of Licensing Automobile Manufacturers (ALAM) and shared licensing 
royalties.289 This time, however, the patent war did not end there. In the 
early 1900s, Henry Ford—whose goal was to mass produce affordable 
automobiles—attempted to join the ALAM but was rebuffed.290 Refusing 
to back down, Ford proceeded with his manufacturing plans and shortly 
thereafter was sued for patent infringement.291 After prolonged litigation 
lasting almost a decade, the courts sided with Ford, concluding that his 
product did not infringe on the Selden patent.292 The ALAM 
consequently dissolved and was replaced by a new organization, the 
Automobile Board of Trade (ABT), that welcomed all applicants and 
granted members royalty-free cross licenses for all patents.293 Indeed, the 
ABT’s approach served as a model for patent pooling arrangements going 
forward, including in the airline industry.294 
The Wright brothers are renowned for inventing the airplane and 
achieving the first successful flight in Kitty Hawk, North Carolina.295 No 
doubt their invention was groundbreaking, but the Wrights’ success in 
the courtroom played a huge role in securing their place in history. In the 
early 1900s, various parties were working on aircraft technology—
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specifically flight stabilization—including Orville and Wilbur Wright. 
The Wrights invented a system that controlled flight by warping the 
airplane’s wings, for which they ultimately obtained U.S. Patent No. 
821,393 (“‘393 patent”), titled “Flying-Machine,” in 1906.296 Around the 
same time, Glenn Curtiss developed his own system of control that 
achieved the same end, i.e., aircraft stabilization, but through different 
means, namely, wing flaps.297 When the industry adopted Curtiss’s 
method, the Wright brothers sued for patent infringement. 
The Wrights initiated the airplane patent war by filing suit against 
Curtiss in 1909 alleging that his method of stabilization infringed the ‘393 
patent.298 They argued, in short, that the ‘393 patent was broad and 
covered various methods of controlling a flying machine, including the 
wing-flapped method used by Curtiss.299 The court agreed and issued an 
injunction against Curtiss prohibiting his company from manufacturing 
or selling aircraft.300 But the battle didn’t end there as Curtiss then 
attempted to design around the ‘393 patent, triggering yet another round 
of lawsuits.301 And while Curtiss was their primary target, the Wright 
brothers also sued other accused infringers during this same time 
period.302 The Wrights’ campaign ultimately came to an end once World 
War I broke out and the government forced the parties to enter into 
cross-licensing agreements so that sufficient aircraft were available for 
battle.303 
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By no means is this an exhaustive list of historical patent wars. The 
twentieth century also witnessed hard-fought battles over the intellectual 
property covering the radio, laser technology, disposable diapers, 
semiconductor chips, and instant photography, just to mention a few.304 
While each of these stories is unique, common threads run through them 
all. Disruptive and groundbreaking technologies spur patent wars. Yet, 
the “best” of those technologies does not necessarily win the war. Instead, 
it appears to be the party with the most effective litigation strategy—
meaning the most persuasive arguments, the deepest pockets, the 
strongest conviction, or a combination of all three—who generally ends 
up the winner.305 
The dawn of the Information Age, or the Third Industrial 
Revolution as it is sometimes called, has ushered in a new era of 
innovation.306 New technologies not only have given birth to new 
industries but transformed old ones. From personal computers and 
smartphones to artificial intelligence and self-driving cars, the current 
economy is driven by technological advances and, consequently, patents 
are arguably more important than ever.307 It should come as no surprise, 
then, that patent wars are once again on the rise. 
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For close to a decade, Apple and Samsung—the largest tech 
companies in the world—went head-to-head in an epic battle over 
patents related to smartphone technology.308 Apple first sued Samsung 
for patent infringement in April 2011 and sought, among other things, an 
injunction to block Samsung from importing and selling its smartphones 
in the United States.309 Samsung countersued, eventually leading to a full-
fledged patent war between the two companies across the globe.310 This 
high-drama litigation included a $1 billion jury verdict in favor of Apple 
(that was reduced by the district judge and later reversed in part by the 
Federal Circuit),311 an ITC order in favor of Samsung that banned the 
importation of certain allegedly infringing Apple products (until 
President Obama vetoed it),312 and a trip to the Supreme Court.313 In 
2018, Apple and Samsung agreed to settle after a retrial resulted in a jury 
awarding Apple $539 million in damages.314 There was no clear winner in 
the end, and it’s hard to say whether it was worth the time, energy, and 
resources it took to fight this prolonged battle. 
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While Apple and Samsung were the chief players in the smartphone 
wars, they were not alone. It was actually Nokia, a Finnish 
telecommunications company, that fired the first shot in 2009 when it 
sued Apple for infringing ten of its patents.315 For the next decade, 
practically all the major players in the smartphone business became 
enmeshed in the patent wars in one way or another.316 When Google’s 
Android operating system became the target of a series of lawsuits, for 
example, the company responded by acquiring Motorola Mobility, only 
to sell it off to Lenovo a few years later at a significant loss.317 Other 
companies involved in the smartphone patent wars included Microsoft, 
Ericsson, Huawei, and HTC, just to name a few.318 
So now that the smartphone wars are over, what’s next? Forecasters 
have predicted that the next major patent battle could be over automated 
cars, the internet of things, cannabis technology, or fintech.319 Truth be 
told, any of these technologies might find itself at the center of the next 
patent war. But a recent lawsuit, USAA v. Wells Fargo, may be an 
indicator of which direction we are headed. 
B.      USAA v. Wells Fargo 
The United Services Automobile Association (USAA) is a financial 
company headquartered in San Antonio, Texas that provides members of 
the military and their families banking, insurance, investment, and 
retirement products and services.320 Unlike traditional banks, USAA has 
always had to interact with its customers remotely because they are 
located around the world.321 Consequently, USAA has long relied on 
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patent portfolio, and sold it in 2014 for just under $3 billion). 
 318 Id. 
 319 See supra Introduction.  
 320 Complaint at 2, United Servs. Auto Ass’n v. Wells Fargo Bank (E.D. Tex. June 7, 2018) 
(No. 2:18-CV-00245). 
 321 Id. at 3. 
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innovation and new technologies—many of which are award-winning—
to best serve its customer base.322 
One of USAA’s key technologies is Deposit@Home®, a system that 
facilitates capture and remote deposit of checks. USAA’s system, which 
was launched in 2006, allows consumers to deposit checks at anytime 
from anywhere in the world by taking pictures of the checks with their 
mobile phones.323 Between 2013 and 2018, USAA was granted numerous 
patents related to its remote deposit capture (RDC) technology including, 
but not limited to, the following: U.S. Patent Nos. 8,392,332 (“‘332 
patent”); 8,699,779 (“‘779 patent”); 8,708,227 (“‘227 patent”); 8,977,571 
(“‘571 patent”); 9,224,136 (“‘136 patent”); 9,336,517 (“‘517 patent”); 
9,818,090 (“‘090 patent”); 10,013,605 (“‘605 patent”); and 10,013,681 
(“‘681 patent”) (collectively, “USAA RDC Patents”). USAA claims it has 
invested millions of dollars and thousands of employee hours developing 
these patented technologies and does not license them to competitors, 
including Wells Fargo.324 
Yet, USAA is not alone in securing and enforcing patents related to 
RDC technology. Mitek Systems, a California-based software company, 
threatened to sue USAA back in 2012 for infringing several of its patents 
covering mobile deposit technology.325 USAA responded by filing a 
lawsuit against Mitek seeking a declaratory judgment that the patents 
were not infringed and unenforceable,326 and asserting claims against 
Mitek for trade secret misappropriation, breach of contract, and fraud.327 
Specifically, USAA alleged that it was involved in business dealings with 
Mitek pursuant to which USAA licensed software from Mitek beginning 
around 2006.328 USAA claims that, in the course of those dealings, it 
 
 322 See, e.g., Wendy Poling, Introducing USAA Labs: Member-Driven Innovation, USAA (Feb. 
2017), https://communities.usaa.com/t5/Money-Matters/Introducing-USAA-Labs-Member-
driven-innovation/ba-p/114187 [https://perma.cc/Y5WX-BSX7]; USAA—Most Innovative 
Finserv of the Year: 2018 BAI Global Innovation Award Winners, BAI, https://www.bai.org/
globalinnovations/awards/2018-winners/usaa-finserv-of-the-year [https://perma.cc/9SJL-Y3JS]. 
 323 Complaint, supra note 320, at 3–4, ¶¶ 10–12. 
 324 Id. at 4, ¶ 12. 
 325 Complaint at 4–5, ¶¶ 8–11, United Servs. Auto Ass’n v. Mitek Sys., Inc. (W.D. Tex. Mar. 
29, 2012) (No. 5:12-cv-00282). 
 326 Id. at 5, ¶ 12. 
 327 Id. at 1, ¶ 1. 
 328 Id. at 5–7. 
LABELLE.SCHOONER.42.1.2 (Do Not Delete) 1/13/21  10:37 AM 
330 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1 
 
disclosed the RDC invention to Mitek pursuant to a confidentiality 
agreement.329 According to USAA, Mitek inappropriately used that 
proprietary information to apply for the patents now being asserted 
against USAA.330 Following more than two years of vigorous litigation, 
USAA prevailed on a motion for summary judgment on non-
infringement grounds.331 Mitek and USAA then reached a settlement 
agreement in September 2014. Although no money changed hands, the 
parties recognized that they each have distinct patent rights with respect 
to RDC, and Mitek promised not to sue USAA for patent infringement 
based on any of its current products, including its Deposit@Home® 
application.332 
Right around the time the USAA-Mitek litigation started, there was 
an uptick in the use of RDC technology throughout the United States.333 
Whereas only about 500 financial institutions offered the technology in 
2012, that number grew to almost 6,000 by 2016 with an estimated eighty 
million consumers using remote deposit.334 As use of RDC became 
widespread, USAA looked to monetize its patents. To that end, USAA 
sent letters to Wells Fargo and hundreds of other banks that use Mitek’s 
technology encouraging them to take a license.335 While it is unclear 
 
 329 Id. at 6, ¶ 17. 
 330 Id. at 8–9, ¶ 25; Mitek Claims USAA Stole Its RDC Patent to Make Knock-Off Version, 
CREDIT UNION J. (Apr. 18, 2012, 4:55 PM), https://www.cujournal.com/news/mitek-claims-usaa-
stole-its-rdc-patent-to-make-knock-off-version [https://perma.cc/ATH6-EL45]. 
 331 Michael T. Zoppo, Insight: Patents as Weapons in Financial Services Industry—A New Era, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 22, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X669
ABGK000000?bna_news_filter=ip-law&jcsearch=BNA%2520000001695ee2d3dbaf797eeb7c1
a0002#jcite [https://perma.cc/L5RZ-CGXF]. 
 332 See Press Release, Mitek Sys. Inc., USAA and Mitek Settle Lawsuit, GLOBAL NEWSWIRE 
(Sept. 3, 2014, 6:00 PM), https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2014/09/03/663580/
10097126/en/USAA-and-Mitek-Settle-Lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/8PS4-WEKZ]. 
 333 See Bryan Yurcan, USAA Wants Banks to Pay It for Remote Deposit Capture, AM. BANKER 
(May 22, 2017, 1:01 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/usaa-wants-banks-to-pay-it-
for-remote-deposit-capture [https://perma.cc/B6EG-CD7Q]. 
 334 Bob Meara, State of Remote Deposit Capture 2017: The Final Stretch, CELENT (Mar. 20, 
2017), https://www.celent.com/insights/185277546 [https://perma.cc/KE5J-XBTN]; Yurcan, 
supra note 333. 
 335 Penny Crosman, USAA Won $200M from Wells Fargo in Patent Fight. Will Others Be On 
the Hook?, AM. BANKER (Nov. 18, 2019, 12:10 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/
usaa-won-200m-from-wells-fargo-for-patent-infringement-will-it-stop-there [https://perma.cc/
P8X4-6SXB]; Yurcan, supra note 333 (quoting USAA’s Vice President of Corporate 
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whether any banks took USAA up on that offer, we know Wells Fargo 
engaged in discussions with USAA, but ultimately declined to take a 
license.336 
On June 7, 2018, USAA sued Wells Fargo—one of the largest banks 
in the country—in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas 
for infringing four of the USAA RDC Patents.337 Just a month later, USAA 
filed a second infringement suit in the same court against Wells Fargo—
this time asserting the remaining five USAA RDC Patents.338 Wells Fargo 
initially responded to both suits by answering the complaint, asserting 
various affirmative defenses, and seeking a declaratory judgment of non-
infringement and invalidity.339 Notably absent from the response were 
counterclaims against USAA for infringement of Wells Fargo patents, 
something we usually see in patent infringement cases between 
competitors.340 
Why USAA targeted Wells Fargo among all the banks using Mitek’s 
RDC technology is hard to know. Perhaps it is because Wells Fargo had 
admitted how essential mobile deposit is for its customers.341 Or maybe 
USAA was trying to minimize the risk of being countersued for patent 
infringement since Wells Fargo has a far smaller patent portfolio than, 
say, Bank of America or JP Morgan Chase.342 Indeed, as just mentioned, 
Wells Fargo had not asserted any of its patents against USAA. Finally, 
USAA may have believed that Wells Fargo would settle quickly and take 
 
Development, Neff Hudson, as saying, “[W]e’re looking at a license program so that we can bring 
some of the value [the technology has created] back to our membership base.” (insertion in 
original)). 
 336 First Amended Complaint at 16–17, ¶ 53, United Servs. Auto Ass’n v. Wells Fargo Bank 
(E.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2018) (No. 2:18-CV-00245). 
 337 Complaint, supra note 320. 
 338 Complaint, United Servs. Auto Ass’n v. Wells Fargo Bank (E.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2018) (No. 
2:18-CV-00366). 
 339 See generally Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and 
Counterclaims to Plaintiff’s Complaint, United Servs. Auto Ass’n v. Wells Fargo Bank (E.D. Tex. 
Aug. 14, 2018) (No. 2:18-CV-00245) [hereinafter Answer 1]; Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s 
Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim to Plaintiff’s Complaint, United Servs. Auto 
Ass’n v. Wells Fargo Bank (E.D. Tex. Oct. 15, 2018) (No. 2:18-cv-00366) [hereinafter Answer 2]. 
 340 Instead, Wells Fargo only counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement 
and invalidity. Answer 2, supra note 339, at 26–27. 
 341 See Answer 1, supra note 339, at 6, ¶ 21. 
 342 See supra Section IV.B (discussing patent holdings of banks). 
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a license in light of the other major scandals and lawsuits facing Wells 
Fargo in recent years.343 Whatever the reason, it soon became clear that 
Wells Fargo planned to use full resources to defend itself against USAA’s 
claims. 
Shortly after answering the complaints, Wells Fargo began to put its 
defensive strategy into action. In the first lawsuit, Wells Fargo brought a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(c) on the grounds that the patents-in-suit were ineligible 
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.344 USAA then filed its opposition to 
the 12(c) motion in late October 2018 arguing that its invention was 
patentable subject matter under § 101 and relevant case law.345 On 
November 8, 2018—just a couple of weeks after USAA filed its opposition 
to the 12(c) motion—Wells Fargo petitioned the PTAB to review the 
USAA RDC Patents at issue in the first lawsuit in a CBM proceeding.346 
Like in so many patent cases, USAA v. Wells Fargo was now proceeding 
in parallel at the District Court and the PTAB. 
On November 28, 2018, USAA filed a First Amended Complaint to 
address the issues raised by Wells Fargo’s motion for judgment on the 
pleadings.347 The court then discussed Wells Fargo’s motion as moot but 
granted leave to re-file in fifteen days.348 Wells Fargo later informed the 
court that it did not intend to re-file the Rule 12(c) motion, but said it 
 
 343 See, e.g., Matt Egan, The Two-Year Wells Fargo Horror Story Just Won’t End, CNN (Sept. 
7, 2018. 11:43 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/09/07/news/companies/wells-fargo-scandal-
two-years/index.html [https://perma.cc/9VT5-QYAJ] (discussing how Wells Fargo had 
experienced a “cascade of scandals that . . . rocked . . . [the bank] to its core”); Dr. Nir Kossovsky, 
This is Why USAA Singled Out Wells Fargo for Patent Infringement, AM. BANKER (June 20, 2018, 
10:02 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/this-is-why-usaa-singled-out-wells-
fargo-for-patent-infringement [https://perma.cc/SH62-FH9L] (“Wells Fargo is relatively more 
vulnerable than its peers, its defenses more likely to be questioned and discounted because its 
‘soft power’—the reputation institutions build through credible communications and authentic 
trustworthy actions over time—has been significantly eroded.”). 
 344 Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, United Servs. Auto Ass’n v. Wells 
Fargo Bank (E.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2018) (No. 2:18-CV-00245). 
 345 Response, United Servs. Auto Ass’n v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 2:18-CV-00245 (E.D. Tex. 
Oct. 26, 2018). 
 346 Petition for Covered Business Method Review of Claims 1-20 of U.S. Patent No. 9,335,517, 
Wells Fargo Bank v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, No. CBM2019-00003 (Nov. 8, 2018). 
 347 First Amended Complaint, United Servs. Auto Ass’n (E.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2018) (No. 2:18-
CV-00245). 
 348 Order, United Servs. Auto Ass’n (E.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2019) (No. 2:18-CV-00245). 
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may raise some of the same substantive arguments in a later summary 
judgment motion.349 In the meantime, USAA moved to compel the 
deposition of Wells Fargo’s expert, Peter Alexander, who submitted a 
declaration in support of the CBM petitions.350 USAA claimed that it was 
entitled to depose Alexander because some of his statements were 
inconsistent with positions that Wells Fargo took in the motion for 
judgment on the pleadings.351 
The court ultimately denied the motion as premature since 
Alexander had not been designated as an expert in the court 
proceedings.352 Most notable about the court’s order, however, was Judge 
Gilstrap’s strong language admonishing the parties for gamesmanship—
namely, using the district court to better position themselves before the 
PTAB.353 The fact that Wells Fargo failed to renew its motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, for example, indicated to the court that the 
§ 101 motion had been filed solely for the purpose of uncovering USAA’s 
litigation positions in the CBM proceedings.354 
Subsequent to Wells Fargo filing its CBM petitions, the PTO 
promulgated Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance 
(PEG).355 Since early 2018, when Andrei Iancu became PTO director, the 
Office has taken various steps to address the concerns about § 101 raised 
by the Supreme Court’s trilogy of cases—Mayo, Myriad, and Alice—
 
 349 Id. at 2 n.3. 
 350 Id. at 1–3. 
 351 Id. at 2–3. 
 352 Id. at 3. 
 353 Specifically, the order said: 
[T]he Court is persuaded that both parties have used (and continue to attempt to use) 
this Court as a mere tool to better posture their positions as regards the co-pending 
CBM proceedings before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board . . . . The Court does not 
countenance—in fact this Court is offended by—the strategic use of an Article III 
Court to gain a tactical advantage in any parallel proceeding. Such [conduct] overtly 
demonstrates the parties’ lack of recognition and reliance on the district court as a 
deliberative body. Moreover, such gamesmanship reflects a clear lack of respect for the 
Third Branch of our national government. This Court will not ignore such conduct. 
Id. at 4. 
 354 Id.; see also Scott McKeown, Judge Gilstrap Cautions on Tactics Directed Solely to PTAB 
Interests, PATS. POST GRANT (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.patentspostgrant.com/judge-gilstrap-
cautions-tactics-directed-solely-ptab-interests/#page=1 [https://perma.cc/QL7Y-5JH8]. 
 355 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019). 
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mentioned above.356 In short, Iancu and the PTO have tried to make it 
easier to satisfy the requirements of § 101, and PEG is a continuation of 
that effort.357 Congress, too, has been working on § 101 reform with a 
draft bicameral, bipartisan proposal introduced in May 2019 and 
hearings held in the Senate the following month.358 Among other things, 
the proposed legislation would eliminate the judicially-created 
exceptions to § 101.359 Congress also recently reintroduced and held 
hearings on the STRONGER Patents Act, a bill that would weaken post-
grant proceedings, for example by heightening the standard for 
invalidating a patent at the PTAB and making IPR and PGR available only 
to parties accused of infringement.360 
Getting back to USAA v. Wells Fargo, the PTAB ordered USAA and 
Wells Fargo to submit additional briefing in light of PEG.361 On March 
20, 2019, Wells Fargo filed an IPR petition with respect to the ‘090 
patent—one of the patents at issue in the first lawsuit—and then moved 
to dismiss the CBM petition on that patent, which the PTAB granted.362 
Around the same time, Wells Fargo petitioned the PTAB to review in a 
CBM proceeding three of the five USAA RDC Patents at issue in the 
second lawsuit. Between mid-May and early June, the PTAB denied 
institution of CBM review for the remaining patents from the first lawsuit 
 
 356 See La Belle, supra note 92, at 617–18 (explaining how the PTO issued guidance shortly 
after Iancu took the helm at the PTO clarifying how to apply the Alice subject matter test). 
 357 See, e.g., Aseet Patel & Craig Kronenthal, First PTAB Reversals Under New Subject Matter 
Eligibility Guidance, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/02/14/
first-ptab-reversals-new-subject-matter-eligibility-guidance/id=106312 [https://perma.cc/
4CR7-LAMQ] (discussing how Iancu has “led the charge to improve predictability of patent-
eligible subject matter”). 
 358 See Eileen McDermott, Draft Text of Proposed New Section 101 Reflects Patent Owner 
Input, IPWATCHDOG (May 22, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/05/22/draft-text-
proposed-new-section-101-reflects-patent-owner-input/id=109498 [https://perma.cc/2PDD-
9MMQ]. 
 359 Id. 
 360 Support Technology and Research for Our Nation’s Growth and Economic Resilience 
(STRONGER) Patents Act of 2019, S. 2082, 116th Cong. (2019). See generally Innovation in 
America–How Congress Can Make Our Patent System STRONGER: Hearing on S. 2082 Before the 
Subcomm. on Intell. Prop. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 361 See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, No. CBM2019-00003 (P.T.A.B. 
June 3, 2019). 
 362 Wells Fargo Bank v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, No. CBM2019-00002 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 26, 
2019). 
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(the ‘779, ‘571, and ‘517 patents) on the ground that all three patents fell 
within the “technological invention” exception to section 18 of the AIA.363 
Wells Fargo responded by immediately filing IPR petitions for those three 
patents as it had earlier for the ‘090 patent.364 On August 26, 2019, the 
PTAB denied institution of IPR for the ‘090 patent because the board 
determined that there was not a reasonable likelihood Wells Fargo would 
prevail in invalidating any of the challenged claims.365 Shortly thereafter, 
in October 2019, the PTAB denied institution of CBM review for the 
three patents from the second lawsuit (the ‘136, ‘605, and ‘681 patents) 
again because those patents fell within the “technological invention” 
exception to section 18 of the AIA.366 For whatever reason, Wells Fargo 
did not petition for IPR with respect to these patents as it did for the ones 
in the first lawsuit. Thus, the only outstanding issue at the PTAB was 
whether IPR would be instituted on the ‘779, ‘571, and ‘517 patents. 
With respect to the litigation, the court issued a claim construction 
ruling, and the parties engaged in mediation in both cases during this 
same time period.367 When mediation failed to result in settlement, USAA 
and Wells Fargo prepared the cases for trial. In the months leading up to 
 
 363 See Wells Fargo Bank v. United States Auto Ass’n, No. CBM2019-00004 (P.T.A.B. May 15, 
2019); Wells Fargo Bank v. United States Auto Ass’n, No. CBM2019-00005 (P.T.A.B. June 3, 
2019); Wells Fargo Bank v. United States Auto Ass’n, No. CBM2019-00003 (P.T.A.B. June 3, 
2019).  
 364 Petition for Inter Partes Review of Claims 1, 5–10, 12–14, 17–20 of U.S. Patent No. 
9,336,517, Wells Fargo Bank v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, No. IPR2019-01081 (P.T.A.B. June 5, 
2019) (‘517 patent); Petition for Inter Partes Review of Claims 1–13 of U.S. Patent No. 8,977,571, 
Wells Fargo Bank v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, No. IPR2019-01082 (P.T.A.B. June 5, 2019) (‘571 
patent); Petition for Inter Partes Review of Claims 1–18 of U.S. Patent No. 8,699,779, Wells Fargo 
Bank v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, No. IPR2019-01083 (P.T.A.B. June 5, 2019) (‘779 patent). 
 365 Wells Fargo Bank v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, No. IPR2019-00815 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 26, 
2019). 
 366 Matthew Bultman, USAA E-Check Patents Not Eligible For CBM Review: PTAB, LAW360 
(Oct. 2, 2019, 7:08 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1205350/usaa-e-check-patents-not-
eligible-for-cbm-review-ptab [https://perma.cc/E4NV-PAKP]. 
 367 See Report of Mediation, United Servs. Auto Ass’n v. Wells Fargo Bank (E.D. Tex. July 30, 
2019) (No. 2:18-CV-00245) (mediation); Order, United Servs. Auto Ass’n v. Wells Fargo Bank 
(E.D. Tex. July 9, 2019) (No. 2:18-CV-00245) (claim construction); Order, United Servs. Auto 
Ass’n v. Wells Fargo Bank (E.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2019) (No. 2:18-CV-00366) (construction); Report 
of Mediation, United Servs. Auto Ass’n v. Wells Fargo Bank (E.D. Tex. July 30, 2019) (No. 2:18-
CV-00366) (mediation); Claim Construction Memorandum Opinion and Order, United Servs. 
Auto Ass’n v. Wells Fargo Bank (E.D. Tex. July 29, 2019) (No. 2:18-CV-00366) (claim 
construction). 
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trial, the parties filed summary judgment motions, including a motion by 
Wells Fargo on § 101 grounds, which the court denied in both cases.368 
Ultimately, USAA agreed to narrow its claims for trial—only proceeding 
on some claims of the ‘090 and ‘571 patents in the first trial and some of 
the claims of the ‘605 and ‘681 patents in the second trial—but explicitly 
reserved its right to pursue the non-asserted patent claims in a separate 
trial.369 
When trial began in the first case in late October, Wells Fargo’s IPR 
petition with respect to the ‘571 patent was still pending before the PTAB. 
After a five-day trial, the jury rendered its verdict finding that Wells Fargo 
willfully infringed one or more of the asserted patent claims and awarded 
USAA $200 million in damages.370 On November 12, the court entered a 
final judgment on the verdict.371 Almost two months later, the second case 
went to trial, and the jury likewise rendered a verdict that Wells Fargo 
had willfully infringed one or more of the patent claims at issue.372 
Damages in the second suit totaled $102,792,510, bringing the total 
amount that Wells Fargo owes USAA to over $300 million.373 Notably, 
Wells Fargo did not pursue an invalidity defense in the first suit for some 
reason, but it did in the second case and the jury rejected that defense. As 
expected, Wells Fargo is pursuing post-trial motions, including a motion 
for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial motion, in both cases. 
In the meantime, since the district court entered final judgment in 
the first case, the PTAB has issued orders granting Wells Fargo’s petition 
to institute IPR regarding the ‘779, ‘571, and ‘517 patents.374 In so doing, 
the Board rejected USAA’s argument that it should deny institution in 
 
 368 Minutes for Initial Pretrial Conference Held Before U.S. District Judge Rodney Gilstrap, 
United Servs. Auto Ass’n (E.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2019) (No. 2:18-CV-00245). 
 369 Plaintiff’s Third Amended Disclosure Narrowing Claims for Purposes of Trial, United 
Servs. Auto Ass’n (E.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2019) (No. 2:18-CV-00245); Plaintiff’s Second Amended 
Disclosure Narrowing Claims for Purposes of Trial, United Servs. Auto Ass’n (E.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 
2020) (No. 2:18-CV-00366). 
 370 Verdict Form, United Servs. Auto Ass’n (E.D. Tex. Nov. 6, 2019) (No. 2:18-CV-00245). 
 371 Final Judgment, United Servs. Auto Ass’n (E.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2019) (No. 2:18-CV-00245). 
 372 Final Judgment, United Servs. Auto Ass’n (E.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2020) (No. 2:18-CV-00366). 
 373 Id. 
 374 Wells Fargo Bank v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, No. IPR2019-01083 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 9, 2020) 
(‘779 patent); Wells Fargo Bank v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, No. IPR2019-01082 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 
13, 2019) (‘571 patent); Wells Fargo Bank v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, No. IPR2019-01081 
(P.T.A.B. Jan. 13, 2020) (‘517 patent). 
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light of the advanced stage of the related litigation because Wells Fargo, 
as mentioned above, did not pursue an invalidity defense at trial.375 The 
PTAB has a year from the time of institution to render its decision on the 
validity of these three patents.376 
In addition to the ongoing litigation at the PTAB, Mitek filed a 
declaratory judgment action against USAA in the Northern District of 
California on November 1, 2019, seeking a declaration of non-
infringement with respect to the ‘779, ‘517, ‘090, and ‘571 patents.377 
USAA responded by filing a motion to dismiss for lack of declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction on the grounds that there is no evidence that an 
infringement suit by USAA against Mitek is imminent.378 USAA argued 
that Mitek’s technology was only a part of Wells Fargo’s allegedly 
infringing system, so USAA’s claims against Wells Fargo did not create a 
justiciable case or controversy between USAA and Mitek.379 Alternatively, 
USAA moved to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Texas because 
it involved the same patents and same issues involved in the litigation 
between USAA and Wells Fargo.380 The motion to transfer the case to the 
Eastern District of Texas was granted on April 23, 2020.381  
This declaratory judgment suit is notable for a few reasons. First, the 
timing is odd since it was filed almost a year and a half after USAA sued 
Wells Fargo and when trial in the first case was already underway.382 
 
 375 See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank, No. IPR2019-01082, at 12–14. 
 376 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(c) (2018). 
 377 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Mitek Sys., Inc. v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 1, 2019) (No. 3:19-CV-07223). 
 378 United Services Automobile Association’s Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss or 
Transfer at 1, Mitek (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2020) (No. 3:19-CV-07223) [hereinafter USAA’s Motion]. 
 379 Id. 
 380 Id. 
 381 Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Transfer; Granting Defendant’s Administrative 
Motion for Leave to File Response; and Overruling Plaintiff’s Objection to Reply Evidence, Mitek 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2020) (No. 3:19-CV-07223). 
 382 As USAA had argued in its motion to transfer: 
Mitek filed this complaint approximately seventeen months after the USAA-
Wells Fargo litigation was filed, and only after the Texas court had 
construed the claims of the Patents-in-Suit, decided dispositive motions, 
confirmed that all of the Patents-in-Suit are subject matter eligible under 35 
U.S.C. § 101, and a jury trial was already underway. 
USAA’s Motion, supra note 378, at 1. 
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Second, Mitek only seeks a declaration of noninfringement and not 
invalidity, much like Wells Fargo only pursued non-infringement 
defenses in the first case. Perhaps Mitek is not challenging these patents 
under § 101 because doing so could cast doubt on the patentability of its 
own RDC patents.383 Of course, that does not explain why Wells Fargo 
failed to raise an invalidity defense at the first trial, especially given the 
patents cannot be challenged on § 101 grounds in the pending IPRs.384 
Finally, this declaratory judgment action is a clear attempt by Mitek to 
forum shop since the Northern District of California—which is where 
Wells Fargo is headquartered, but not Mitek—is much more hospitable 
to accused patent infringers than the Eastern District of Texas.385 While 
forum shopping is not at all unusual in patent cases, this late attempt to 
find a more favorable forum does raise the question why Wells Fargo 
made no attempt to transfer out of the Eastern District of Texas, a court 
with a reputation for being strongly pro-patentee.386 
So, for now, we will have to wait and see how this litigation saga 
among USAA, Wells Fargo, and Mitek ends. Like in many post-AIA 
patent cases where there is parallel litigation in federal court and at the 
PTAB, questions about res judicata, estoppel, and the finality of 
judgments are likely to come up.387 For example, will the infringement 
verdict against Wells Fargo have any impact on Mitek’s declaratory 
judgment suit on the same patents? Or could Wells Fargo be precluded 
from litigating its invalidity defense before the PTAB since it could have 
raised that at trial but did not? That precise issue was before the Supreme 
Court this past term in Lucky Brand v. Marcel, a trademark case in which 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied “defense 
preclusion” to bar the Lucky Brand from litigating a defense it could have 
 
 383 See, e.g., Megan M. La Belle, Public Enforcement of Patent Law, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1865, 1871 
(2016) (explaining how competitors can be reluctant to challenge each other’s patents as invalid 
because they do not want to put their own intellectual property at risk). 
 384 See supra note 83 (patents can only be challenged on 102 and 103 grounds in IPRs). 
 385 See USAA’s Motion, supra note 378, at 1. 
 386 See Megan M. La Belle, Influencing Juries in Litigation “Hot Spots,” 94 IND. L.J. 901, 932–
33 (2019). See generally Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic 
Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 889 (2001). 
 387 See generally Paul R. Gugliuzza, (In)valid Patents, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271 (2016); 
Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Renewed Efficiency in Administrative Patent Revocation, 104 IOWA L. 
REV. 2643 (2019). 
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raised in a previous lawsuit.388 Although the Court held that defense 
preclusion did not apply in Lucky Brand because the second case involved 
different conduct and different claims, it did not preclude the possibility 
of a party like Wells Fargo being precluded in the future for failing to raise 
certain defenses when it had the chance.389 
VI.      THE FUTURE OF FINTECH PATENTS 
Whether the financial industry is headed toward a patent war 
remains uncertain. If the verdicts in favor of USAA are upheld, it is 
certainly a possibility. But what would a patent war over fintech look like? 
Perhaps the big banks that become fintech leaders will go to battle over 
their most valuable patents like Apple and Samsung did with 
smartphones.390 Or maybe the fintech wars would look fundamentally 
different because they would not involve direct competitors. Instead, we 
could see big banks and tech giants going head-to-head in the courtroom 
to determine who will control the patent rights in the fintech space. That 
all being said, it is also possible that there will be no patent war at all 
because Bank of America and others with substantial fintech patent 
portfolios could decide to utilize their intellectual property in wholly 
different ways. 
A.      Fintech Patent Wars 
As has been discussed at length in this Article, patent wars are not 
new despite what the common perception may be. Yet, trying to identify 
a pattern and predict where and when the next patent war will erupt is 
extremely difficult. Some researchers suggest that certain criteria are key 
to this analysis, including, but not limited to: number of patents, research 
and development expenditure, number of NPEs, number of operating 
 
 388 Megan La Belle, Opinion Analysis: Court Unanimously Reverses 2nd Circuit on “Defense 
Preclusion,” But on Very Narrow Grounds, SCOTUSBLOG (May 14, 2020, 8:29 PM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/05/opinion-analysis-court-unanimously-reverses-2nd-
circuit-on-defense-preclusion-but-on-very-narrow-grounds [https://perma.cc/DKA4-LEDP]. 
 389 Id. 
 390 See supra Section V.A. 
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companies, and technology inception years.391 Others have suggested 
that, in addition to portfolio strength, the smartphone wars were a result 
of the size of the market, multiple converging technologies, a highly 
fragmented industry, and competing standards.392  
But those are not the only factors that contribute to patent wars. 
Patent wars are often very personal and are caused, at least in part, by 
individuals who feel that full-scale war is the only option. For example, 
Steve Jobs infamously told his biographer that he was willing “to go to 
thermonuclear war” to enforce Apple’s patents.393 In dramatic fashion, 
Jobs said he would “spend [his] last dying breath . . . [and] every penny of 
Apple’s $40 billion in the bank to right this wrong,” and pledged “to 
destroy Android, because it’s a stolen product.”394 Aside from Jobs, the 
determination and competitive spirit of Henry Ford, Thomas Edison, and 
the Wright brothers undoubtedly influenced the outcome of their 
respective patent wars.395 The potential presence of a zealous champion 
for the cause makes predictability even more difficult. 
With these criteria in mind, is a fintech patent war likely? The aim 
of this Article is not to undertake an empirical investigation of this 
question, but rather to begin the conversation regarding the potential for 
a fintech patent war and to imagine what such a battle might look like. In 
our view, consideration of even just a few of the common features of prior 
patent wars suggests that fintech could indeed be fertile ground for a 
patent war in the future. 
The sheer number of patents related to a particular technology tends 
to increase the chances of a war erupting.396 As has been discussed, 
technology companies, banks, and other financial services companies 
have been building their fintech patent portfolios for more than a decade 
 
 391 See generally James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Patent Litigation Explosion, 45 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 401 (2013); Malik & Balasubramanian, supra note 7 (identifying factors that 
contribute to patent wars). 
 392 Ho, supra note 12. 
 393 WALTER ISAACSON, STEVE JOBS 512 (2011). 
 394 Id. 
 395 See supra Section V.A. 
 396 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 391, at 429 (explaining how high patenting rates increase 
the likelihood of litigation). 
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now.397 These patented inventions run the gamut and include, among 
other things, blockchain and other distributed ledger technology, mobile 
payment technology, and cryptocurrencies and other digital assets.398 
And it’s not just the United States that is focused on fintech, but patent 
offices and innovators all over the world. The Intellectual Property Office 
of Singapore, for example, announced in 2018 that it would expedite its 
processes for granting fintech patents, cementing Singapore’s position as 
the world’s leading fintech hub.399 What is more, Chinese innovators are 
leading the charge on fintech patents, especially those related to 
blockchain and artificial intelligence;400 Ant Financial, the highest-valued 
fintech firm in the world, is a Chinese company.401 Japan and Japanese 
applicants, likewise, have been early adopters of cryptocurrencies and 
other fintech innovations and have pursued patent applications across 
the globe.402 The bottom line is that many fintech patents have already 
been issued and the numbers will likely continue to grow in the 
foreseeable future. 
Industry fragmentation, occurring when numerous companies 
operate in the same space, also contributes to the development of patent 
wars. Fintech services are provided by companies from around the globe 
 
 397 See supra Part IV; see also Bruce Berman, Fintech Patent Competition: Fierce, Diverse, 
Growing, IP CLOSEUP (Feb. 1, 2016), https://ipcloseup.com/2016/02/01/fintech-patent-
competition-fierce-diverse-growing/ [https://perma.cc/XHL4-JH2A]. 
 398 See supra Section IV.B (discussing fintech patent holdings). 
 399 INTELL. PROP. OFF. OF SING., LAUNCH OF FINTECH FAST TRACK INITIATIVE: AN 




 400 Jane Croft, China Plays Catch-Up with Europe and U.S. in Patents Filing Race, FIN. TIMES 
(July 9, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/8ecf7464-8d05-11e9-b8cb-26a9caa9d67b [https://
perma.cc/WHK4-9QUL]; Laura Noonan, China Leads Blockchain Patent Applications, FIN. 
TIMES (Mar. 25, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/197db4c8-2e92-11e8-9b4b-bc4b9f08f381 
[https://perma.cc/XPA9-XUHC]. 
 401 See H2 VENTURES & KPMG, 2019 FINTECH 100: LEADING GLOBAL FINTECH INNOVATORS 
12 (2019), https://h2.vc/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/2019Fintech100.pdf [https://perma.cc/
K92D-FRHK]. 
 402 KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP, TRENDS IN BLOCKCHAIN 25, 30 (2019), 
https://www.kilpatricktownsend.com/-/media/Feature/Insights/Publication/2019-Patent-
Trends-Study_Blockchain.ashx?la=en&hash=
4E735DF72581CA986B860747389502256C1AA867 [https:// perma.cc/JJF3-W239] 
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that specialize in technology, banking, and other industries. Some of 
those companies are large and well-established—such as Apple and 
Visa—while others are startups just getting off the ground.403 In a highly 
fragmented industry like this, players will look for a way to eliminate 
competition in order to capture more of the market.404 One way to 
accomplish that is by waging, and ultimately winning, a patent war. More 
pointedly, companies take patents that were originally acquired as 
defensive mechanisms (i.e., shields from patent infringement suits) and 
turn them into swords to either extract high rents from competitors or 
quash them completely.405 
The length of time it takes for a technology to penetrate the market 
can also influence whether a patent war will erupt around that 
innovation. The faster consumers adopt a particular technology, the more 
likely companies will turn to litigation in order to reap the benefits.406 The 
penetration rate for smartphones, for example, is shaping up to be one of 
the fastest—if not the fastest—in history.407 While it’s too soon to know 
exactly how quickly certain fintech technologies will spread, there are 
indicators that it won’t take very long especially in certain parts of the 
world. One recent study shows that fintech adoption rates in six markets 
(Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore, United Kingdom, and United 
States) increased from 16% to 60% on average between 2015 and 2019.408 
While that increase is remarkable, fintech is penetrating even faster in 
emerging markets like China, India, Russia, and South Africa, which 
 
 403 See Jeff Kauflin, The 10 Biggest Fintech Companies in America 2020, FORBES (Feb. 12, 2020, 
9:23 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffkauflin/2020/02/12/the-10-biggest-fintech-
companies-in-america-2020/#80ad2e81259f [https://perma.cc/F7JM-RSNM]; see also supra 
Section IV.B (discussing the industry participants in fintech). 
 404 Shaver, supra note 280, at 1892. 
 405 Id. (“As an industry matures . . . dominant players convert their [patents] into weapons to 
eliminate their competition.”); Colleen Chien, A Race to the Bottom, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. 10, 
11 (Jan./Feb. 2012) (“Patents acquired to shield their owners have ironically ended up being used 
as swords in the hands of others.”). 
 406 Malik & Balasubramanian, supra note 7, at 127. 
 407 Michael DeGusta, Are Smart Phones Spreading Faster Than Any Technology in Human 
History?, MIT TECH. REV. (May 9, 2012), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/427787/are-
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boast adoption rates greater than 80%.409 This growth is attributable to 
many factors, but one key difference is that incumbent financial 
institutions (e.g., banks, insurers, and stock brokers) are much more 
active in the fintech market than just a few years ago.410 Assuming this 
trend continues, a patent war could very well be on the horizon. 
Finally, fintech may be the type of technology that people are willing 
to go to war over for more personal reasons. Even without a zealot like 
Steve Jobs or Henry Ford, others could emerge as champions for fintech 
and ultimately play an important role in a patent war. As has been 
discussed, the story of fintech is complicated, and we lack consensus on 
precisely what constitutes fintech.411 For many, however, the defining 
characteristic of fintech and what makes it revolutionary is its ability to 
democratize financial services.412 Consumers who previously were shut 
out of certain markets—say lending and financial advising—now have 
access because of technologies like digital crowdfunding and robo-
advisors.413 Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are similarly inclusive and 
intended to provide greater economic freedom to consumers.414 Even the 
introduction of bitcoin technology—through a pseudonymous white 
paper distributed on a cryptography listserv—embodies this 
democratizing principle.415 Because this ethos about fintech is so 
pervasive, attempts to limit access to cryptocurrencies, blockchain, and 
 
 409 Id. at 7–8. 
 410 Id. at 8. 
 411 See supra Section IV.A (discussing definitions of fintech). 
 412 See Omarova, supra note 3, at 782 (“[F]intech is often praised for its unprecedented 
potential to make financial markets more inclusive and equally accessible.”); see also EUR. 
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related technologies through patent enforcement would probably be met 
with strong resistance and could result in a full-scale war. 
Let’s assume these or other relevant factors converge, and a patent 
war erupts. What might that war look like? There are at least three 
scenarios that should be considered. First, there may be a “traditional” 
patent war between direct competitors like we saw with smartphones, 
sewing machines, and airplanes. Perhaps USAA v. Wells Fargo is just the 
beginning, and additional infringement suits against other financial 
institutions using similar RDC technology will follow if the verdicts for 
USAA are upheld.416 Or a war could break out between direct competitors 
over a totally different financial technology. Bank of America, for 
instance, has not only been building its blockchain portfolio for several 
years now, it also appears to be focused on developing blockchain 
products.417 But one of Bank of America’s direct competitors, JP Morgan 
Chase, is being even more aggressive in this area.418 JP Morgan is devoting 
a lot of money and human resources to fintech, and announced last year 
that it is launching a blockchain-based digital currency called JPM 
Coin.419 JP Morgan has acquired some blockchain patents along the way, 
but its portfolio pales in comparison to Bank of America’s.420 So, is a 
 
 416 See Brandy Bruyere, Update on USAA RDC Litigation, NAFCU (Nov. 20, 2019), https://
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patent war between Bank of America and JP Morgan Chase imminent? 
Only time will tell whether these or other direct competitors will go head-
to-head over fintech or whether a patent war in this space might take on 
a different character. 
One possibility is that a war will break out, but not between direct 
competitors. Instead, because companies from different industries are 
developing and using similar financial technologies, we could see a battle 
between a major high-tech company, say Apple or Google, and a big bank 
like JP Morgan or Bank of America. James Bessen and Michael Meurer 
have suggested that patent litigation is relatively common when firms do 
not directly compete with each other for at least two reasons.421 First, the 
more industries involved with a technology, the more patents there will 
be; this makes it more difficult to become aware of all of the relevant 
patents and avoid infringement.422 Second, firms in the same industry 
have to interact with each other regularly and therefore are more inclined 
to settle a patent dispute. When indirect competitors are involved, on the 
other hand, parties are less concerned about their future dealings and 
therefore more willing to fight it out in court.423 In an inter-industry 
patent dispute, there is also the possibility that firms in one industry are 
better versed in patents and patent litigation than firms in another 
industry and can exploit that disparity to gain an advantage. High-tech 
companies like Apple have far more experience than financial institutions 
with enforcing patents and defending against infringement claims,424 so 
that certainly could impact how a future patent war might play out. 
A third type of patent war that could develop would pit large and 
established operating companies—either in the financial or high-tech 
industry—against small fintech companies or startups. In this scenario, 
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incumbents sue disruptors primarily to suppress competition and 
maintain market share, or in some cases, to generate licensing fees.425 
Either way, big companies leverage their greater resources and patent 
experience to gain a competitive edge, sometimes even when their 
infringement claims are not particularly strong—a litigation tactic Ted 
Sichelman refers to as “patent bullying.”426 This is precisely what 
happened in the telecommunications industry more than a decade ago 
when Verizon, Sprint, and AT&T sued startup Vonage for patent 
infringement over its Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) technology.427 
In the early 2000s, VoIP was hailed as the “new and hot and disruptive 
technology,” and Vonage was called a trailblazer that would shape the 
future of the telecommunications industry.428 Yet, after losing a series of 
patent infringement suits, Vonage’s market position took a major hit, and 
the company never managed to recover.429 Vonage’s VoIP and financial 
innovations like blockchain offer clear parallels. Both are disruptive 
technologies that are expected to transform an industry. Of course, 
blockchain might turn out to be “‘the most overhyped’ technology in 
history,” as economist Nouriel Roubini claims.430 But if key fintech 
innovators fall victim to patent bullies like Vonage did, we may never find 
out. 
B.      Alternatives to Patent War 
This Article thus far has focused on the possibility of a fintech patent 
war and has offered some suggestions about what that could look like. We 
recognize, however, that a full-blown war over fintech patents is not 
predetermined and things may play out differently in the end. However, 
even if fintech patent owners decide not to enforce their intellectual 
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property rights through litigation, patents are likely to influence the 
development of this nascent industry in other ways. 
By amassing patents on the same or similar fintech products, Visa, 
Bank of America, and others are potentially creating what is known as a 
patent thicket. A patent thicket is “a dense web of overlapping intellectual 
property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to 
actually commercialize new technology.”431 Patent thickets tend to 
emerge where a product incorporates numerous technologies, there are 
overlapping patent rights, and it can be difficult to determine whose 
patent protects which aspect of the technology.432 When competitors own 
roughly equal numbers of patents, they tend to deal with patent thickets 
by creating patent pools and other types of cross-licensing 
arrangements.433 Whether patent thickets and cross-licensing 
arrangements are good or bad for innovation is hard to say. Some claim 
they drive up transaction costs, create backlog at the PTO, and result in 
too many low-quality patents.434 Others argue that the “patent arms race” 
actually increases innovation by encouraging patenting, and decreases 
prices because cross-licensing allows more players to enter the market.435 
Without wading into that debate, it is clear that fintech companies will 
have to navigate this patent thicket problem in order to commercialize 
their products. 
How the patent thicket problem is resolved will depend largely on 
who owns the patents and who wants to commercialize their products. If 
most of the patents are owned by operating companies, they will likely 
enter into cross-licensing agreements.436 Things become more 
complicated, however, if a lot of the patents—or at least some key 
patents—are owned by NPEs. In that case, the NPE has no need for a 
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cross-license since it does not plan to commercialize the invention. That 
gives the NPE the upper hand and the ability to engage in patent 
“holdup,” meaning it can demand a high royalty rate for a license.437 We 
know that one of the major fintech patents owners, Bizmodeline, is an 
NPE,438 and there are likely other NPEs acquiring these kinds of patents 
to be asserted down the road. If the rents demanded by NPEs are too high, 
those patents will have to be challenged. Of course, with the impending 
sunset of CBM, accused infringers will be left with fewer options for 
invalidating these NPE patents at the PTAB, so tackling “holdup” 
situations will be harder. 
Patent thickets can also pose problems for smaller innovators that 
hope to commercialize a product but have few to no patents of their own. 
For starters, small companies might decide the patent thicket is simply 
too difficult to navigate and forego entrance into the market, thereby 
stifling competition.439 As for those small firms that do try to secure the 
necessary licenses, they may be priced out of the market because patent 
owners with large portfolios can charge exorbitant prices.440 Patents, in 
other words, may serve as obstacles to market entry for fintech startups 
even in the absence of litigation. 
Finally, what about small fintech innovators that own patents and 
hope to commercialize their products? As an initial matter, patents are 
vitally important for companies trying to attract investors and secure 
venture capital.441 Thus, fintech startups are likely to have at least some 
patents. If those patents turn out to be valuable, they may be able to 
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license them. Sometimes, however, such licensing efforts are rebuffed, 
especially by larger companies that have deeper pockets and don’t believe 
the patent owner will sue.442 When this happens—a phenomenon referred 
to as “hold-out” or “reverse hold-up”—the only choice is litigation, which 
is too expensive for many small patent owners to pursue.443 So, the patent 
owner either does nothing or sells the patent to an NPE with greater 
resources to enforce the patent—neither of which is ideal.444 Perhaps a 
better outcome is when large firms acquire small innovators with valuable 
intellectual property. Although consolidation has potential downsides, 
namely reducing competition,445 it may be the best choice for a small 
company. Indeed, consolidation in the fintech industry is well underway 
with two major transactions in just the past couple months—Visa 
acquiring Plaid for $5.3 billion and Morgan Stanley acquiring E*Trade 
for $13 billion.446 Although it is unclear what role, if any, intellectual 
property played in those particular transactions, there is a good chance 
that patent rights will influence fintech consolidation in the near future. 
CONCLUSION 
Imagine what would happen if Satoshi Nakamoto held patents 
(under an alias of the alias, of course) of key components of blockchain 
technology. A patent war between Nakamoto and, say, Bank of America 
might just rival the personal vendetta that Steve Jobs held over Samsung. 
Nakamoto would spare no expense (financed with bitcoin) in keeping the 
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blockchain revolution from the clutches of the bloated legacy rival. A 
patent war between Bank of America and JP Morgan could also be 
dramatic but might more likely end in a settlement, a pooled 
arrangement, or, perhaps, a merger of the two banks. A fintech patent war 
between Bank of America and Apple might be the most interesting of all, 
pitting the power of finance against the power of technology. We’d 
probably bet on the tech giant to win that one. Either way, a fintech patent 
war could change finance and technology forever. 
 
